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INTRODUCTION 
 
We lack a well-developed positive theory of environmental law. A positive 
environmental law theory, as opposed to a normative theory, explains environmental 
law rather than focus on rationales for reform.1 A positive theory focuses on what 
the law is, not what it should be. 2  Although a positive theory constitutes a 
description, some of this theory describes normative commitments underlying the 
choices found in environmental law. A positive theory need not endorse all aspects 
of existing environmental law. Positivism is not cheerleading. But to the extent a 
positive theory explains the reasons for existing law, it provides the basis for a well-
informed debate about which reforms would improve it and which would make it 
worse. And a conceptual framework aids environmental advocacy, which often 
depends as much upon explaining policy considerations as upon specific details.3 
Such a theory not only aids policy and legal debates, it can also improve 
teaching. Environmental law teaching usually focuses on the mastery of detail. The 
traditional environmental law course covers several complex and often lengthy 
environmental statutes.4 Although nobody disputes the need to teach mastery of 																																																								
1 Cf. Daniel A. Farber & Philip Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political Theory in the 
Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457, 462 (1992) (defining positive political theory as “non-normative” 
because it explains political events rather than evaluate their desirability). See generally 
HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 7–20 (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1967) 
(1960) (describing positive law as “objectively valid norm[s]” and stating that this 
interpretation is possible only under the condition that a basic norm is “presupposed”). 
2 See Adrian Vermeule, Connecting Positive and Normative Legal Theory, 10 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 387, 387–390 (2008) (describing positive and normative legal theory as seemingly 
“radically disjunct” because normative theory focuses on value and desirability while 
positive theory focuses on facts about the law from an internal perspective); James Paul 
Maniscalco, Note, The New Positivism: An Analysis of the Role of Morality in Jurisprudence, 
68 S. CAL. L. REV. 989, 990 (1995) (describing legal theory’s “separation of law as it is from 
law as it ought to be”). 
3 See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (holding that EPA must 
consider cost in deciding whether regulation of mercury from power plants is “necessary and 
appropriate” based largely on philosophy supporting cost-benefit balancing). 
4 See, e.g., ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CONTEXT: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 5–15 (3d ed. 2012) (introducing sources of federal environmental law, including 
numerous environmental statutes); DANIEL A. FARBER & ANN E. CARLSON, CASES AND 
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detail to future environmental lawyers, a conceptual framework can give meaning 
to details. Such a complex field cries out for a positive theoretical foundation. 
Yet, normative scholarship, meaning scholarship aimed at improving rather 
than describing the law, dominates environmental legal theory. And a lot of this 
takes the form of outsider scholarship with a normative orientation in some tension 
with the field’s traditional core commitments. For example, in recent years 
prominent scholars have argued that rational environmental policy requires cost-
benefit analysis (CBA).5 CBA has gained a place in the corpus of environmental 
law, but the normative foundations most commonly associated with CBA come not 
from the values featured in environmental statutes, but from economics, which 
emphasizes the value of economic efficiency.6 Much of the work questioning some 
of the economic reforms, such as the work questioning CBA, offers technocratic 
critiques of the proposed reform.7 Environmental law scholars, for example, have 
argued that quantitative risk assessment and monetization of health and 
environmental effects, which provide most of the technical foundation for CBA of 
environmental regulations, have serious limitations. 8  These critiques make 
important points, but they do not by themselves establish the existence, let alone the 
desirability, of viable alternative forms of analysis emanating from environmental 
law.  
Douglas Kysar, in a thoughtful critique of CBA and the search for objectivity 
underlying it, may speak for a lot of environmental lawyers when he emphasizes that 
“[w]e already had a theory” of environmental law.9 Regulatory reformers’ writing, 
however, does not suggest that they see this theory; it suggests instead that they often 
																																																								
MATERIAL ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 125–201, 395–936 (9th ed. 2014) (covering various 
environmental statutes). 
5 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 
1059, 1067 (2000) (claiming that CBA ensures the public demand for regulation is not 
“rooted in myth”). 
6 See Amy Sinden, Formality and Informality in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 2015 UTAH L. 
REV. 93, 100 (2015) (tracing CBA to its economic roots and utilitarianism with its goal of 
maximizing “the overall welfare of members of society in the aggregate”). I use the term 
CBA here to specify an analytical technique that aims to quantify as many of the costs and 
benefits of a regulatory action as possible. Cf. id. at 97 (noting that the term may refer either 
to highly formal quantitative analysis or to less formal analysis of “pros and cons”).  
7 See id. at 105–07 (describing critics’ focus on measurement difficulties in formal 
CBA). 
8 See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE 
OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 61–90 (2004) (critiquing monetization of 
health and environmental benefits); John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: 
Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 280 
(1991) (describing quantitative risk assessment as providing the “framework” for CBA). 
9 DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE 
SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 3 (2010).  
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see a mass of complex statutory provisions exhibiting little rhyme or reason.10 And 
Kysar himself, in the next sentence, hastens to admit that the theory we had was 
“messy, pluralistic, and pragmatic.”11 Even if environmental lawyers had a theory, 
it may be too messy to even be visible to anybody else. And visibility to non-
specialists matters. After all, the people making many of the most important 
decisions shaping environmental law¾Congressmen, judges, and Presidents¾often 
do not specialize in environmental law.  
Furthermore, positive theory, unless explicitly articulated, may prove invisible 
even to some scholars who devote substantial amounts of time to thinking about 
environmental law. And even those who see a positive theory may not understand it 
well absent a precise articulation of it. 
This Article contributes to the construction of a positive theory of 
environmental law by developing an account of the ends and means of pollution 
control law. Environmental lawyers often use the term “environmental law” 
narrowly to refer to pollution control law alone, but sometimes use this term more 
capaciously to include natural resources law—the law governing the use of federal 
lands. 12  Although natural resources law lies beyond the scope of this Article, 
scholars in that field have found some of the elements of the theory developed here 
useful in thinking about natural resources law.13 Yet, I am agnostic on the question 
of whether we can construct a “unified field” theory that usefully unites 
environmental and natural resources law. So, this Article focuses on environmental 
law defined narrowly as pollution control law.  
The theory discussed in this Article builds on concepts familiar to experts in 
the field. Indeed, environmental law textbooks, including one that I coauthor, 
usually mention the concepts that I rely on as building blocks for this theory.14 The 																																																								
10  See, e.g., Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk 
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 744 (1999) (finding our approaches to risk regulation 
“grossly inconsistent”). 
11 KYSAR, supra note 9, at 3. 
12 See DAVID M. DRIESEN, ROBERT W. ADLER & KIRSTEN H. ENGEL, ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW: A CONCEPTUAL AND PRAGMATIC APPROACH 1 (3d ed. 2016) (noting its focus on 
pollution control statutes while stating that a comprehensive course would address both 
natural resources and pollution control law). The term pollution control law refers to law that 
seeks to limit or clean up pollution, such as the Clean Air and Water Acts. 42 U.S.C.A §§ 
13101–13109 (West 2016); 33 U.S.C.A §§ 1251–1387 (West 2016). Statutes that limit 
activities primarily to address ecological disturbances that do not involve only the release of 
foreign substances into the environment, such as the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.A 
§§ 1531–1544, and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C.A §§ 1701–
1787 (West 2016), fall within the domain of natural resources law.  
13  See Robert L. Fischman & James Salzman, Lessons from Pollution Control: 
Response to Heller and Hobbs 2014, 29 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 950, 950–51 (2015) 
(positing that pollution control law’s use of technology-based regulation as a step toward 
meeting effects-based ideals might have useful analogues for natural resource conservation).  
14 See, e.g., CRAIG, supra note 4, at 17–30 (discussing cost-benefit balancing, effects-
based standards, and technology-based standards); DRIESEN, ADLER & ENGEL, supra note 
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goals discussed include the protection from environmental harm, the realization of 
feasible emission reductions, and the balancing of pollution control’s costs and 
benefits. Environmental law experts know that effects-based standards, technology-
based standards, and cost-benefit balancing play a role in environmental law.15 
Similarly, the means of environmental protection emphasized here—performance 
standards, work practice standards, phaseouts, emissions trading, and pollution 
taxes—do not constitute new discoveries.16  
Yet, environmental law experts do not share as clear an understanding of these 
concepts as one might think. For example, take the idea of technology-based 
standard setting—a form of standard setting that dominates environmental statutes. 
Should we understand technology-based standard setting as a way of establishing 
goals for environmental regulations or as a means of pollution control? To put the 
question a little more precisely, do technology-based statutory provisions use 
technological capabilities as a guide to the appropriate stringency of pollution 
control standards, or do they dictate the technologies that polluters must use? 
Analysts evince some disagreement, and some confusion, about some very basic 
questions. 17  Thus, elucidating basic well-known concepts with some precision 
facilitates discussion of important matters that have received insufficient attention 
in the literature.  
This Article’s most novel contribution, however, comes from using these 
concepts to paint a picture of the field as a whole. While the Article’s primary 
contribution is analytical and descriptive, rather than normative, the analysis used to 
create this picture reveals some novel insights and a valuable research agenda that 
includes normative questions. A fragmented literature discusses many of the core 
concepts employed here individually, but does not bring them together to construct 																																																								
12, at 85–294 (presenting chapters devoted to the concepts addressed in this Article); 
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 
152–156 (7th ed. 2013) (discussing the concepts featured in this Article among others); 
ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW AND 
SOCIETY (4th ed. 2010) (putting significant emphasis on these concepts). 
15 See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Rethinking Health-Based 
Environmental Standards, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1184, 1190 (2014) (identifying cost-benefit 
based, health-based, and technology-based standards as the “three principle approaches for 
determining the stringency of environmental protection”); Thomas O. McGarity, Media-
Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit Balancing Strategies for Environmental Regulation, 
46 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 159 (1983) (evaluating three different approaches to 
environmental regulation: technology-based, cost-benefit-based, and media-quality-based).  
16 See, e.g., RICHARD L. REVESZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 161–93 (3d ed. 
2015) (discussing “command-and-control” regulation, effluent fees, and emissions trading). 
17 See, e.g., March Sadowitz, Note, Tailoring Cost-Benefit Analysis to Environmental 
Policy Goals: Technology- and Health Based Environmental Standards in the Age of Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 2 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 11, 16–17 (1996) (defining technology-based 
standards as “mandat[ing] the use of a particular technology,” but then describing them two 
paragraphs later as sometimes requiring a “level of discharge . . . regardless of the means”). 
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a broader theory. We have, for example, a large literature on CBA,18 a smaller 
literature on technology-based standards,19 and a bit of a literature on effects-based 
standards (supplemented by a large literature on the related idea of precaution and 
technique of risk assessment).20 Bringing these goal concepts together allows an 
exploration of the relationship among our goals, taking us closer to having a positive 
theory of environmental law.21 Similarly, a large literature says something about one 
or another of the means of environmental protection, but relationships among 
various means of environmental protection remain underexamined. And the 
relationship between ends and means has received still less attention. Thus, by 
further developing frequently mentioned concepts and exploring their relationship 
with each other and their placement within statutes, this Article provides an account 
of the field as a whole, at least in terms of how we craft pollution control standards. 
Any legal theory requires some simplification. Thus, the positive theory 
developed here leaves out some details. Environmental law specialists may find 
these omissions troubling, as we pride ourselves on mastery of the law’s details. Yet, 
staring at each tree does not reveal a forest. A theory of sufficient generality to prove 
useful in top-level policy debates and fundamental scholarship must make choices 
emphasizing and explaining some details, especially those crucial to a proper 
understating of core concepts, while leaving others. And the ideas circulating in top-
level policy debates may influence more fine-grained decisions that specialists might 																																																								
18 See Don Bradford Hardin, Jr., Why Cost-Benefit Analysis? A Question (and Some 
Answers) About the Legal Academy, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1135, 1136–39 (2008) (quantifying 
legal scholarship focused on CBA). 
19 See, e.g., Adam Babich, Too Much Science in Environmental Law, 28 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 119, 131–32 (2003); David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, 
Health, and Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and 
Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (2005); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric 
A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 657–60 (2010); Sidney A. 
Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based 
Regulation, DUKE L.J. 729, 729–30 (1991); Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-
Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 85 (2000). 
20  See, e.g., John S. Applegate, Embracing a Precautionary Approach to Climate 
Change, in ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY 171 (David M. Driesen 
ed., 2010) [hereinafter ECONOMIC THOUGHT]; THE BROOKINGS INST., QUANTITATIVE RISK 
ASSESSMENT IN REGULATION 1 (Lester B. Lave ed., 1982); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK 
ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS 9 (1983); THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE 20TH CENTURY: LATE LESSONS FROM EARLY WARNINGS 
1 (Paul Harremoës et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter 20TH CENTURY PRECAUTION]; Donald T. 
Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk 
Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 562 (1992); Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in 
Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1613 (1995).  
21 See Thomas O. McGarity, The Goals of Environmental Legislation, 31 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 529, 530–531 (2004) (employing a more elaborate typology and discussing the 
relationships among goals). 
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think arcane detail would control.22 A positive theory can inform important choices 
if it has sufficient generality to prove useful to nonspecialists who make many key 
decisions without fully understanding each relevant detail.23  
This Article develops a theory of environmental law’s goals in part one. This 
part discusses the concepts of effects-based, technology-based, and cost-benefit 
based goals in turn. It shows how each of these goal-setting rubrics focuses on 
different sets of information and therefore poses different challenges for regulators 
establishing standards. It also discusses the normative values underlying these 
concepts. Part one continues with an analysis of how environmental statutes employ 
these concepts, thereby providing a picture of the normative structure of 
environmental law as a whole, something missing from the literature. It closes by 
showing how understanding environmental law’s goal concepts together yields new 
insights and important research questions.  
The second part describes the regulatory means of meeting these goals. It 
discusses performance standards, work practice standards, phaseouts, emissions 
trading, and pollution taxes. This part closes with an analysis of the positive theory 
of instrument choice found embedded in the law governing means selection.  
The third part shows that putting means and ends together enhances our 
understanding of environmental law and reveals an important research agenda. For 
example, instrument choice scholars often focus on the means of environmental 
protection without explicitly engaging its ends. They usually describe emissions 
trading as the opposite of technology-based standard setting. But recently scholars 
studying emissions trading have found that regulators designing such programs often 
employ technology-based rubrics to establish trading programs’ goals.24 In other 
words, emissions trading programs often are technology-based. Emissions trading’s 
reliance on technology-based standard setting raises an important question about 																																																								
22  See, e.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. 208, 217, 220–21 (2009) 
(construing a requirement that standards reflect “the best technology for minimizing 
environmental impact” as allowing CBA, while expressing dismay about the complexity of 
a contrary structural argument based on detailed statutory language).  
23 I use the term “general policy choices” to refer to legislation and executive orders, 
but to exclude administrative actions implementing general policy choices in particular 
contexts. Thus, I claim that this positive theory can inform rational deliberation about ends. 
See HENRY S. RICHARDSON, PRACTICAL REASONING ABOUT FINAL ENDS 6 (1994) 
(defending rationale deliberation of ends as rational). At the same time, I do not claim that 
the concepts here necessarily suffice to fully justify all, or even most, administrative 
decisions about particular applications See id. at 150–54 (discussing the challenges of 
making coherent explanations for actions, while insisting that satisfactory explanations bear 
some relationship to broader aims). 
24 See, e.g., Heinrich Tschochohei & Zan Zöckler, Business and Emissions Trading 
from a Public Choice Perspective-Waiting for a New Paradigm to Emerge, in EMISSIONS 
TRADING: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, DECISION MAKING AND CORPORATE STRATEGIES 21, 28–
31 (Ralf Antes et al. eds., 2008) (concluding that the European Union (EU) emissions trading 
scheme “reflects a command-and-control approach” because of technology-based 
allocation). 
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what changes in normative orientation might be needed to allow emissions trading 
to more fully realize some of its proponents’ environmental ambitions. For scholars 
promoting emissions trading had hoped that it would free regulators from the task 
of evaluating appropriate technologies, which they hoped to leave to regulated firms 
with superior plant-specific expertise.25  This question about emissions trading’s 
normative orientation matters a great deal to climate disruption law in particular, 
because it has relied heavily on emissions trading, with somewhat disappointing 
results so far.26  
The fourth part issues an invitation to build on the theory of ends and means 
articulated in this Article to create a more complete theory of environmental law. It 
identifies some core components of a broader theory that this Article does not have 
space to address. It also raises the question of how we should understand 
environmental justice’s relationship to a positive theory of environmental law. 
 
I.  ENVIRONMENTAL LAW’S ENDS 
 
This Article relies on a dual conception of environmental law’s goals. First, 
when Congress writes an environmental statute it presumably has some purposes in 
mind, which serve as goals for the statute as a whole. Sometimes, Congress sets out 
goals in the first few sections of a statute, but they may also emerge from legislative 
history or statutory design. 27  Second, Congress usually spells out criteria for 
standard setting in statutes, which guide administrative agency decisions about how 
much pollution control to demand in particular regulations.28 Criteria guiding these 
stringency determinations establish goals for particular regulations. This Article 
treats both the goals of entire statutes and the criteria governing the stringency of 
particular pollution control decisions as goals for environmental law.  																																																								
25 See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Comment, Reforming Environmental 
Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1342–43 (1985) (arguing that emissions trading transfers the 
job of assessing technologies from “bureaucrats” to “business managers”). 
26 See JONAS DREGER, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S ENERGY AND CLIMATE POLICY: 
A CLIMATE OF EXPERTISE? 64 (2014) (discussing a strong academic consensus that the 
European Union’s emissions trading scheme failed during its first few years). I use the term 
“climate disruption” in lieu of the more conventional terms “climate change” and “global 
warming” because “climate disruption” captures the reasons that climate scientists fear the 
particular changes associated with increasing average mean surface temperatures. See 
DRIESEN, ADLER, & ENGEL, supra note 12, at 24 (explaining why White House science 
advisor John Holdren finds the term “climate disruption” more accurate than the 
alternatives). 
27 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A §§ 6902(a), 7401(b) (West 2016); Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 
U.S. 246, 259 (1976) (citing legislative history indicating that Congress considered 
protection of the “health of persons” as Congress’ responsibility). 
28  See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 465 (2001) 
(explaining that Congress requires national ambient air quality standards to be adequate to 
protect public health and has therefore precluded consideration of cost in setting these 
standards). 
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Specifying means and ends does not constitute an exact science because goals 
can be stated at a variety of levels of generality.29 Stating a goal at a very high level 
of generality can make plausible a claim that slightly less general criteria constitute 
means toward a yet more general end.30 Thus, for example, one might posit a very 
general goal for environmental law of improving life on earth. Described this way, 
an analyst might see the goals of environmental statutes as means of achieving this 
larger goal. If one states the goals of environmental law a little less generally as, for 
example, protecting public health and the environment, then one might see criteria 
guiding actual stringency determinations for particular pollutants as means toward 
that end. So, this dual conception is not inevitable.  
Yet, this Article’s dual conception of goals has several advantages. Importantly 
for a positive theory, this goal definition relies on legal texts, especially statutes. A 
goal that has no or little support in legal texts probably has no place in a positive 
theory of environmental law, as such a goal does not describe the law so much as 
seek to give it new normative foundations. While there is nothing wrong with 
normative theory, this Article seeks to help establish a positive theory of 
environmental law.  
This Article treats statutory criteria guiding the stringency of standards set by 
administrative agencies as goals because decisions about pollution control 
standards’ stringency determine what compliant polluters will achieve in practice. 
The criteria governing agency decisions about stringency therefore guide decisions 
about what we should try to achieve. When we speak of a goal, we generally mean 
an understanding of what we are trying to achieve. Therefore, the statutory criteria 
governing decisions about the stringency of standards are most usefully thought of 
as establishing goals for administrative agencies developing pollution control 
standards. The analysis below also reveals that this dual conception yields insights 
into environmental law’s conceptual structure and core normative dilemmas. Thus, 
even though one might view the criteria governing standard setting as a means of 
achieving a statute’s overall goal, this Article initially treats such criteria as goals of 
environmental law, but later considers these criteria’s relationship to statutes’ 
overall goals. 
In particular, this part focuses on effects-based standards, feasibility-based 
standards, and cost-benefit based standards in turn. It then closes by describing some 
insights and research questions that this discussion reveals. 
  
																																																								
29 See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 876–77 (1930) 
(pointing out that a statute’s purpose can be conceived at varying levels of generality).  
30 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2016–17 (2009) (noting that one can plausibly 
identify the aim of any statute as securing “justice and security” and suggesting that doing 
so permits the reaching of arbitrary results).  
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A.  Protecting Public Health and the Environment: Effects-Based Standards 
 
Several statutes and statutory provisions have the goal of protecting public 
health and the environment. Environmental lawyers refer to standards enacted under 
statutory provisions explicitly aiming to protect public health and the environment 
as effects-based standards because these standards have a goal of avoiding harmful 
environmental effects.31 
 
1.  Examples 
 
The Clean Air Act (CAA)32 and Clean Water Act (CWA)33 have the explicit 
goals of protecting public health and the environment. These goals appear as general 
goals for the statutes as a whole and in some key provisions governing standard 
setting.  
The CAA’s very first section declares a “purpose” of “protect[ing] and 
enhanc[ing] the . . . Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health and 
welfare and the productive capacity of its population.”34 This language establishes a 
goal of protecting air quality in order to achieve the more general goals of promoting 
public health and welfare.35 Thus, the CAA embraces a goal of protecting public 
health.36  
It also embraces a goal of environmental protection. The Act protects air quality 
not only to promote public health, but also to improve public “welfare.” The CAA, 
however, defines welfare not only in terms of economic welfare, but also in terms 
of environmental quality.37 Thus, the statute promotes “welfare” by protecting the 
environment from air pollution. 
The CAA’s main operative provisions reinforce this reading of the statute’s 
overall goals.38 The CAA requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to 
establish primary national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) to protect public 
health with an “adequate margin of safety.”39 It also requires “secondary” NAAQS 
to protect public welfare (i.e. the environment) from “known or anticipated adverse 																																																								
31 See, e.g., Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 465 (holding that the CAA’s health-based air 
quality standards must be set at levels corresponding with the “maximum . . . concentration 
. . . that the public health can tolerate” decreased by a margin of safety).  
32 42 U.S.C.A §§ 7401–7671q (West 2016). 
33 33 U.S.C.A §§ 1251–1387 (West 2016). 
34 42 U.S.C.A § 7401(b)(1) (West 2016). 
35 See id.  
36 See Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 466 (explaining that the CAA protects the “health of 
the public”). 
37 See 42 U.S.C.A § 7602(h) (West 2016) (discussing inter alia effects on “soils, water, 
crops, vegetation . . . animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and climate”). 
38  See Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 469 (2004) 
(describing attainment of health-based air quality standards as the “aim[]” of the CAA). 
39 42 U.S.C.A §§ 7409(a)–(b) (West 2016). 
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effects.”40 These provisions direct EPA to establish concrete goals that states must 
achieve through comprehensive pollution control programs. 41  These national 
“ambient” standards specify the level of pollution allowed in the ambient air—the 
air around us—in parts per million of pollution.42 States must then reduce emissions 
from particular pollution sources to the extent necessary to achieve these effects-
based numerical goals.43 Thus, the CAA embraces the goals of protecting public 
health and the environment.44 
The CWA has even stronger and more explicit environmental protection goals. 
Its first section declares an “objective” of “restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 45  Thus, it 
establishes ecological integrity as an environmental goal. It then explicitly sets out 
ambitious subsidiary goals useful to obtaining this broad ecological goal. These 
goals include the elimination of discharges by 1985, the protection of fish and 
wildlife by 1983, and the elimination of toxic pollution in toxic amounts—showing 
an intent to fully protect water quality from environmental harm.46 
The CWA also contains operational provisions that aim to carry out the Act’s 
water quality goals. For it requires states to establish water quality standards roughly 
analogous to the CAA’s NAAQS.47 These effects-based standards must protect the 
water so that people can use it for purposes states embrace and must be consistent 
with the statute’s ecological goals. 48  The CWA envisions state regulation of 
particular pollution sources to obtain these water quality standards.49  																																																								
40 42 U.S.C.A § 7409(b)(2) (West 2016). 
41  See Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60, 65–67 (1975) (describing 
requirements that states adopt implementation plans providing for the attainment of the 
NAAQS). 
42 See id. at 78 (explaining that the NAAQS “deal with the quality of the outdoor air”). 
43 See id. (discussing the requirement that states develop “emission limitations” to limit 
pollution from “power plants, service stations, and the like” to achieve the NAAQS). 
44 See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 249 (1976) (describing the requirement 
that states formulate plan to achieve standards designed to protect public health as the “heart” 
of the CAA); cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 851–52 
(1984) (finding economic purposes relevant to section 117 of the CAA). 
45 33 U.S.C.A§ 1251(a) (West 2016). 
46 Id. §§ 1251(a)(1)–(3). 
47 See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 704 
(1994) (discussing requirement that states establish water quality standards); cf. Miss. 
Comm’n on Nat. Res. v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269, 1275–76 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that states 
have the primary responsibility for establishing water quality standards, but that EPA reviews 
them for compliance with the CWA); Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water 
Pollution: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 206 (1999) 
(discussing the NAAQS and water quality standards as two examples of ambient effects-
based standards). 
48 See 33 U.S.C.A § 1313(c)(2) (West 2016). 
49 See Adler, supra note 47, at 215–40 (describing the requirements for state realization 
of water quality goals). 
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Similarly, the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) has a goal 
of promoting “protection of health and the environment and to conserve” natural 
resources.50 It seeks to achieve this health and environmental protection goal by 
prohibiting open dumping, converting existing open dumps to “facilities” posing no 
“danger to the environment or to health,” and “assuring” that hazardous waste 
management “protects human health and the environment.”51 
Environmental statutes not only employ effects-based standards as goals for 
state pollution control programs. They also include some statutory provisions, 
especially provisions regulating toxic pollution, that seek explicitly to protect public 
health and the environment from specific pollution sources. A fairly typical 
provision requires pollution levels that protect public health with an ample margin 
of safety.52 
 
2.  Analytical Features 
 
An effects-based standard requires the assessment of pollution’s environmental 
and/or health effects in order to determine what level of pollution to tolerate.53 Thus, 
effects-based standards require either quantitative or qualitative risk assessment. So, 
for example, if a standard seeks to protect public health from a carcinogenic 
pollutant, a regulatory agency may seek to determine how often that pollutant will 
cause cancer at various levels.54  The agency must then use this information to 
establish standards that avoid a significant number of cancer cases.55 
Scientific uncertainty, however, usually makes it difficult to set standards based 
on protecting public health or the environment.56 Indeed, this difficulty has helped 																																																								
50 See 42 U.S.C.A § 6902(a) (West 2016).  
51 42 U.S.C.A § 6902(a)(3)–(4) (West 2016).  
52 See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 529 F.3d 1077, 1080–81 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(describing residual risk standards for hazardous air pollutants under the 1990 CAA 
Amendments as protecting public health with an ample margin of safety); Nat. Res. Def. 
Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that EPA must establish 
emission standards for hazardous air pollutants that protect public health with an “ample 
margin of safety”); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 73 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
(describing EPA’s responsibility to provide an “ample margin of safety” from toxic water 
pollution as the toxics section’s “polestar”). 
53 See, e.g., Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512, 520–522 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(finding that EPA failed to adequately take into account health effects when it rejected 
reliance on short-term exposure studies). 
54 See Wagner, supra note 20, at 1618–19 (describing regulation based on health effects 
as trying to achieve a quantitative limit on the amount of risk). 
55 Cf. Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 392–393 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (reversing EPA 
health-based standard because EPA did not protect asthmatics from events triggering a need 
for hospitalization, medication, and disruption of some ongoing activities).  
56  See Alyson C. Flournoy, Legislating Inaction: Asking the Wrong Questions in 
Protective Environmental Decision Making, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 327, 327 (1991) 
(characterizing risk assessment as “inevitably . . . characterized by uncertainty”); Wagner, 
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partially paralyze standard setting for toxic substances.57 We generally do not have 
data that can tell us precisely what health and environmental consequences occur at 
various levels of tolerated pollution.58 Most attempts to associate particular pollution 
levels with particular environmental and health consequences require extrapolation 
from very limited data based on models, and usually our understanding of 
pollution’s effects provides little basis for knowing how to do this extrapolation.59 
Thus, in practice, effects-based standards usually require acceptance of agency 
guesses about the risk of pollution at various levels, and the controversy around 
those guesses sometimes proves paralyzing.60 
On the other hand, establishing a safe level does not require consideration of 
pollution control costs.61 For example, if we know that an air pollutant causes a 
significant number of cancer cases at three parts per million (ppm), we cannot allow 
pollution exceeding three ppm under a statutory provision demanding protection of 
public health from air pollution.62 If it turns out that reducing pollution below three 																																																								
supra note 20, at 1614–15 (describing efforts to base standards on the science of health and 
environmental protection as a “failure”). 
57 See Wagner, supra note 20, at 1677–1681 (explaining that efforts to base standards 
on unresolvable scientific determinations produces a great amount of inaction and delay); 
see, e.g., Patricia Ross McCubbin, The Risk in Technology-Based Standards, 16 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 30 (2005) (attributing EPA’s failure to regulate hazardous air 
pollutants under “the early health-based scheme . . . in large part to EPA’s difficulty in 
deciding . . . which level of pollution should be deemed ‘safe’”). Cf. John P. Dwyer, The 
Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 251–260 (1990) (describing 
EPA’s efforts to cope with the difficulties of implementing this health-based scheme). 
58 See Wagner, supra note 20, at 1619–22 (explaining why scientific data does not 
usually establish the precise risk a substance poses to humans).  
59 See id. at 1625–27 (explaining the need for scientifically non-verifiable assumptions 
to guide extrapolations from experimental data regarding health effects of high dose 
exposure in laboratory animals to predict effects upon large populations of human beings 
experiencing exposures to low doses). 
60 See, e.g., Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of 
Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1307–
08 (1985) (explaining that EPA failed to promulgate effects-based effluent standards for 
toxic water pollutants because of insufficient data to determine safe levels). 
61 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 470–71 (2001) (holding that 
the CAA bars consideration of costs and therefore cost-benefit analysis for establishing a 
NAAQS because it directs EPA to protect public health and the environment); Union Elec. 
Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256 (1976) (holding that considerations of cost and feasibility are 
wholly foreign to review of state implementation plans to meet the health-based NAAQS); 
see also Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184–88 (1978) (holding that the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) requires the protection of species from extinction “whatever 
the cost”).  
62 Deciding what constitutes a “significant number” of cancer cases requires a policy 
judgment, but cost is also irrelevant to that policy judgment. If we conclude that 100 cancer 
cases are significant they do not become insignificant just because we discover that avoiding 
them would prove costly.  
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ppm proves insanely costly, we might wish as a policy matter to refrain from 
reducing pollution below three ppm. But if we planned to follow a policy of 
protecting public health, we would have to reduce the level below three ppm 
regardless. Cost is irrelevant to the question we ask when engaged in effects-based 
standard setting, what level of the pollutant being regulated is safe.63  
The fact that we usually will not know exactly how many cancer cases occur at 
three ppm (or any other level) does not undermine the point that cost’s magnitude is 
irrelevant to standard setting if the standard setting seeks to establish a safe level of 
pollution. The uncertainty just means that the regulator seeking to establish a safe 
level will have to make some judgment under uncertainty about what levels might 
be safe. That fact does not make costs relevant to determining what levels are safe.64  
In some cases, the only safe level might be a zero level of pollution.65 In 
practice, administrators may well resist zero levels because they imagine that a zero 
pollution requirement may cause a regulated industry to shutdown, which would 
pose political problems for the agency. But that political consideration does not 
undermine the basic point that if a zero level is the only safe level then an agency 
must prohibit all pollution if it plans to implement a command to only permit safe 
levels of pollution.66 The resistance to a zero level of pollution, in this context on 
grounds of costs, constitutes a departure from a command to protect public health 
and the environment. Protection of public health and the environment from targeted 
pollution demands, in principle, that agencies ignore costs. 																																																								
63 See Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 470–71 (holding that EPA may not consider cost when 
establishing a NAAQS because the statute requires protection of public health and the 
environment); cf. Natural Res. Defense Council (NRDC), Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1165 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (forbidding the consideration of cost in determining a safe level of emissions 
because this is consistent with the statutory emphasis on safety). Judge Bork’s opinion for 
the court in NRDC went on to suggest that EPA may consider cost in deciding what margin 
of safety should be provided beyond the safe level. NRDC, 824 F.2d at 1165–66 (stating that 
EPA may consider feasibility in deciding how much of a margin to leave below a “safe” 
level of reductions). This dictum appears to conflict with the subsequent Supreme Court 
decision in American Trucking and appears incoherent, as the question of safety cannot be 
separated from the methodologies used to provide a margin of safety under prevailing 
conditions of uncertainty. See American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 570–71 (holding EPA may 
not consider cost in protecting public health with an adequate margin of safety); NRDC, 824 
F.2d at 1165 n.11 (not requiring a two-step methodology separating safety from an ample 
margin of safety and recognizing that statistical methods may obviate the distinction). 
64  See Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 468 (holding that the requirement to deal with 
scientific uncertainty through an “adequate margin of safety” does not permit consideration 
of cost). 
65 Accord NRDC, 824 F.2d at 1165 (requiring EPA to set a standard of zero emissions 
if there is no level generating an “acceptable risk”). 
66 See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 259 (1976) (explaining that Congress in 
requiring achievement of health-based air quality standards by a date certain had decided 
that plants should “meet the standard . . . or be closed down”) (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 
2–3 (1970)). 
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3.  Normative Underpinning 
 
Accordingly, the choice of an effects-based goal embraces a normative 
commitment to health and environmental protection. It gives that commitment 
primacy over competing values.67 
 
B.  Maximizing Feasible Reductions: Technology-Based Standards. 	
Many environmental statutes rely heavily on provisions that seek to maximize 
feasible reductions.68 Many of these provisions, as I have argued elsewhere, are best 
understood as embodying a feasibility principle, which aims to maximize pollution 
reductions subject to a presumptive prohibition of regulations causing widespread 
plant shutdowns.69  
 
1.  Examples 
 
The CWA’s Best Available Technology (BAT) program, which often serves as 
the main example of technology-based regulation in the literature, exemplifies this 
feasibility principle.70 The CWA demands “effluent limitations . . . , which (i) shall 
require the application of the best available technology economically achievable.”71 
This provision requires the “elimination” of pollution “if . . . technologically and 
economically achievable.” 72  This elimination language implies that if EPA can 
demand elimination of a pollutant without widespread plant shutdowns it should do 
so, but that it must, at least presumptively, refrain from establishing demanding 
requirements like a zero limit when such limits would cause widespread shutdowns. 
The demand for feasibility implies that some pollution limits—presumably those 
many plants can only attain by shutting down—are infeasible. 
Similarly, the provision governing technology-based standards for hazardous 
air pollutants under the 1990 CAA Amendments exemplifies the feasibility 
principle. It demands that EPA “require the maximum degree of reductions in 
emissions . . . that the Administrator . . . determines is achievable.”73 Many other 																																																								
67  Mary Jane Angelo, Embracing Uncertainty, Complexity and Change: An 
Ecopragmatic Reinvention of a First-Generation Environmental Law, 33 ECOLOGY L. Q. 
105, 108 (2006) (describing risk-based approaches as “absolutist”). 
68  Driesen, supra note 19, at 20–22 (providing examples of statutory provisions 
requiring maximization of feasible reductions). 
69 See id. at 8–22 (describing the feasibility principle as requiring maximization of 
reductions subject to a presumption against widespread plant shutdowns).  
70 See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 25, at 1334–35 (describing BAT as the 
“primary basis” for the “existing system of pollution regulation”). 
71 33 U.S.C.A §1311(b)(2)(A) (West 2016). 
72 Id. 
73 42 U.S.C.A§7412(d)(2) (West 2016). 
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statutory provisions instruct administrative agencies to write standards that 
maximize economically and technologically feasible reductions in pollution.74 And 
EPA has sometimes interpreted provisions that lack superlatives requiring it to 
“maximize” reductions or base standards on the “best” technology—such as 
requirements for standards based on “reasonably available control technology”—as 
similarly demanding maximization of reductions to some extent.75  
 
2.  Analytical Features 
 
We might think of technology-based standards as the analytical opposite of 
effects-based standards.76  Setting them requires evaluation of technological and 
economic feasibility, but no analysis of health and environmental effects.77 This 
“feasibility analysis” requires identification of potential pollution control techniques 
and then assessment of their pollution control potential, basically a question of 
engineering. The statutory provisions governing technology-based standard setting, 
however, clearly allow imposition of requirements not based on end-of-pipe 
																																																								
74 See, e.g., Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 509–510 (1981) 
(holding that OSHA demands a feasibility analysis and does not contemplate CBA). 
75 See McGarity, supra note 21, at 543 (noting that EPA interprets requirements for 
“reasonably available control technology” to demand “the lowest emission limitation” 
attainable through use of feasible technology) (emphasis added).  
76 See, e.g., Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1163–64 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987) (reversing an EPA decision using an analysis of technology and its cost as a 
predicate for regulation under an effects-based statutory provision); see generally Adler, 
supra note 47, at 206–07 (describing technology-based and environmentally protective 
standards as “philosophically different” strategies because the former focuses on “economic 
and technological feasibility” whilst the latter “are set at levels . . . necessary to protect 
human health and environmental quality”). 
77 See Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 217 F.3d 861, 862 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (contrasting risk-
based and technology-based regulation); Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. EPA, 59 F.3d 1351, 1353 
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that Congress replaced EPA’s health-based regulation of hazardous 
air pollutants “with a . . . technology-based regulatory scheme”). Patricia McCubbin 
concedes that a “literal reading” of the CWA supports the idea that EPA should not consider 
environmental benefits in establishing BAT standards. See McCubbin, supra note 57, at 15. 
Nevertheless, she argues that the law does not mean what it says because considering cost 
without considering benefits would illogically lead to the conclusion that paying any cost for 
technological improvement is “unacceptable.” Id. This argument is incorrect. It assumes that 
no costs should be imposed unless CBA shows that the benefits outweigh the costs. Id. But 
nothing in the statute or the legislative history supports that idea. See id. (citing legislative 
history rejecting CBA). 
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controls.78 And some technology-based standards reflect evaluation of technological 
changes other than end-of-the-pipe controls.79  
Feasibility analysis requires not only evaluation of technological possibilities, 
but also an assessment of the cost of employing promising pollution control 
techniques.80 Regulators can then compare these cost estimates to the economic 
capabilities of regulated facilities to ensure that the promulgated pollution reduction 
requirements do not offend the feasibility constraint by causing widespread plant 
shutdowns. 81  Feasibility analysis, however, does not require assessment of 
environmental and health effects. It does not compare costs to the benefits of 
pollution control, but rather to the economic capabilities of facilities.82 
Environmental law experts agree that this analytical task usually proves much 
more manageable than the assessment of environmental and health effects required 
for effects-based standard setting.83 Yet, agencies frequently must cope with some 
uncertainty about how well technologies will work in new contexts and they often 
end up overestimating costs because of the difficulty of anticipating innovation.84 
But in several instances, EPA has been unable to make much progress with effects-
based standards, but moved ahead when Congress or the courts authorized a 
technology-based approach.85 For example, EPA only regulated eight hazardous air 
pollutants in the 1970s and ‘80s when the CAA required its hazardous air pollutant 
																																																								
78 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A §§7412(d)(2), 7429(a)(3) (West 2016). 
79 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §63.1213 (2016); Nat’l Ass’n for Surface Finishing v. EPA, 795 
F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (describing EPA’s revision of a technology-based standard to 
reflect demonstrated ability to phase out a toxic fume suppressant).  
80 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 467 (2001) (discussing 
technology-based statutory provisions requiring or authorizing the consideration of cost). 
81 See, e.g., ConocoPhillips Co. v. EPA, 612 F.3d 822, 837 (5th Cir. 2010) (observing 
that EPA assessed the cost’s likely impact on the regulated industry without comparing costs 
to  benefits). 
82 Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 498 (2004) (rejecting 
claim that a pollution limit was infeasible when the regulated company failed to provide 
“financial data” showing the cost’s impact on the “operation and competitiveness” of the 
regulated mine) (internal quotations omitted). 
83 See Angelo, supra note 67, at 129 (stating that technology-based standards have 
“worked best”); Adam Babich, supra note 19; McGarity, supra note 15; Shapiro & McGarity, 
supra note 19; Wagner, supra note 19, at 85. 
84 See Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, 
and Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 1998, 2048–49 (2002) (finding that ex 
ante cost estimates have usually been higher than actual costs incurred and attributing this, 
in part, to unanticipated innovation); see, e.g., Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 431–
33 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (putting a burden on EPA to justify a conclusion that other plants in an 
industry can meet standards already obtained by some plants).  
85 See, e.g., EPA v. Cal. ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202–03 
(1976) (pointing out that Congress adopted technology-based standards to cure problems in 
implementing and enforcing effects-based standards for water pollution). 
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standards to protect public health.86 Congress, fed up, amended the statute in 1990 
to require a round of technology-based rulemaking before the agency resumed 
setting effects-based standards (if needed). 87  EPA established an array of 
technology-based standards regulating almost 200 pollutants.88 Technology-based 
standards have proven less analytically burdensome than effects-based standards.89 
 
3.  Normative Underpinning 
 
The feasibility principle takes cost into account, but focuses on the distribution 
of costs, seeking to avoid widespread unemployment as it otherwise maximizes 
environmental and health protection.90 It seeks to avoid environmental and health 
problems that can cause devastating losses to some individuals without causing 
significant unemployment, which may constitute a similarly important disruption of 
affected workers’ lives.91 The feasibility principle gives health and environmental 
protection a high priority but reflects reluctance to cause perhaps equally serious 
hardships by causing widespread plant shutdowns.  
 
C.  Optimal Pollution: Cost-Benefit Based Standards 
 
Cost-benefit balancing plays an increasing role in environmental law. The 
standard justification for such balancing involves a search for optimal pollution 
levels—defined as a level of pollution reduction that balances costs and benefits at 
the margin.  
  
																																																								
86 See Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 529 F.3d 1077, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 
2008). 
87 See id. (stating that Congress sought to hasten the process of standard setting by 
listing pollutants itself and then requiring technology-based regulation of them). 
88 See id. (noting that the 1990 CAA Amendments listed 191 substances for regulation); 
EPA, NATIONAL AIR TOXICS PROGRAM: THE SECOND INTEGRATED AIR TOXICS REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, at xiii (2014) (stating that EPA has issued 97 technology-based standards 
regulating 174 major categories of major sources of hazardous air pollutants).  
89 The CWA has a similar history. See Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory 
Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 
37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1307–1308 (1985) (discussing the failure of health-based standards 
for toxic water pollutants and the substitution of technology-based standards). 
90 See Driesen, supra note 19, at 34–35 (characterizing the feasibility principle as 
focusing on the distribution of costs to determine significance).  
91 See id. at 37 (pointing out that costs forcing plant closures “can have a devastating 
impact on workers’ lives”).  
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1.  Examples 
 
The environmental statutes do not require optimal pollution levels.92 Yet, cost-
benefit balancing has entered environmental law, primarily through court decisions 
and executive orders seeking to avoid overly burdensome pollution reduction 
requirements.  
The courts have required cost-benefit balancing for standard setting under the 
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)93 and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),94 both of which demand protection from “unreasonable 
risk.”95 The most recent executive order, like its predecessors, also requires CBA “to 
the extent permitted by law” and authorizes White House oversight of this 
requirement through the Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).96  Finally, in 1996 Congress amended the Safe 
Drinking Water Act (SDWA) to include CBA.97  
Despite CBA’s role in court decisions, executive orders, and the SDWA, 
examples of standards set through cost-benefit balancing prove hard to come by.98 
The decision interpreting TSCA to demand cost-benefit balancing led to a halt of 
final rules under TSCA’s main standard setting provision, probably because the 
analytical burdens imposed made standard setting impracticable. 99  Congress 
recognized this problem and updated TSCA in 2016 to require health protective 
standards, while paradoxically continuing to require CBA.100  																																																								
92 See Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 710 n.27 
(1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing statutes requiring a “reasonable relation between 
costs and benefits” but not mentioning any requirement for optimal emission reductions). 
93 Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1217 (5th Cir. 1991) (requiring EPA 
to evaluate each regulatory option’s costs and benefits). 
94 Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1248 (9th Cir. 1984) (describing 
FIFRA as a cost-benefit statute); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998, 1005 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976) (approving EPA’s decision to allow some uses of heptachlor and chlordane based 
on CBA); cf. Angelo, supra note 67, at 162 (noting that EPA has interpreted FIFRA to require 
cost-benefit balancing even though FIFRA does not “mandate . . . a strict cost/benefit 
analysis”). 
95 See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2006); 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136a(c)(5)(C)–(D); 136d(b) (West 
2016). 
96 Exec. Order No. 13,563 §1(b), 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011). 
97 See 42 U.S.C.A. §300g-1(b)(3)(C) (West 2016). 
98 Cf. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,576, 41,603 
(July 9, 2004) (codified at 40 C.F.R pts. 9, 122–25) (applying a cost-benefit test to water 
intake regulations under the CWA). 
99 See Angelo, supra note 67, at 132 n.100 (finding that FIFRA stands virtually alone 
in employing a cost/benefit approach because the Fifth Circuit’s TSCA decision imposing 
CBA rendered TSCA “impotent”); Sinden, supra note 6, at 130 n.128 (noting that “TSCA 
has come to a grinding halt” in the wake of the 5th Circuit decision overturning EPA’s 
asbestos ban based on CBA). 
100 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 2605(a), (b)(4), (c)(2)(A)(iv)(II) (West 2016).  
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The executive orders only permit CBA “to the extent permitted by law” and the 
major pollution control statutes rely heavily on technology-based and effects-based 
goal setting.101 As a result, CBA under the executive orders usually provides an input 
into debates between regulatory agencies and OIRA about what standards the 
agencies should promulgate, but the agencies generally do not justify their standards 
through cost-benefit balancing. 102  The SDWA demands CBA and has not 
thoroughly paralyzed rulemaking, but it only permits CBA in very limited situations 
and does not require cost-benefit balancing.103 
 
2.  Analytical Features 
 
CBA requires a broad assessment of a proposed standard’s consequences, 
which combines all of the analytical difficulties of effects-based standard setting 
with those of technology-based standard setting and then adds another step, that of 
monetization.104 As a result, CBA creates an extremely difficult analytical burden.105  
In order to identify the benefits of pollution control decisions, the analyst 
conducting CBA must associate particular pollution reductions with specific health 
and environmental consequences. Although administrative agencies sometimes base 
effects-based standards on qualitative risk assessment, the need to compare costs 
with benefits makes quantitative risk assessment essential. 106  The problem of 
uncertainty making reasonably precise quantitative prediction impossible for 
effects-standard setting arises in the cost-benefit context as well.107  
CBA also requires an estimate of the pollution costs that polluters will incur in 
order to achieve a particular level of reduction. This control cost estimate almost 																																																								
101  Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(b), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) 
(requiring application of cost-benefit principles “to the extent permitted by law”). 
102 Cf. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 226 (2009) (upholding one use 
of CBA under the CWA). 
103 See City of Portland, v. EPA, 507 F.3d 706, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting CBA 
cannot be used to establish a less stringent treatment technique for Cryptosporidium than the 
most stringent feasible); Sinden, supra note 6, at 40–41 (describing the SDWA as 
authorizing, but not requiring, departures from the feasibility principle based on CBA). 
104 See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 8, at 35–40 (explaining and critiquing 
the role of monetization in CBA); David M. Driesen, Getting Our Priorities Straight: One 
Strand of the Regulatory Reform Debate, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10003, 10019 n.204 (explaining 
why CBA is more analytically difficult than feasibility analysis). 
105  See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF 
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 134 (1991) (discussing information 
gaps respecting costs and benefits). 
106 See Applegate, supra note 8, at 281–82 (describing the move from qualitative and 
quantitative risk assessment as facilitating CBA to limit federal regulatory action). 
107 See, e.g., ConocoPhillips Co. v. EPA, 612 F.3d 822, 837, 842 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(upholding EPA’s decision not to employ CBA because it could not reliably estimate 
ecosystem benefits). 
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always requires the same form of analysis used in technology-based rulemaking.108 
In order to predict the costs of a particular required level of pollution control, the 
regulator must evaluate the technological changes needed to achieve that level of 
control. It can then estimate the cost of employing the needed technological 
changes.109  
Finally, in order to compare costs and benefits, the analyst must translate 
quantitative estimates of pollution controls’ benefits—saved lives, avoided illness, 
and reduced ecological destruction—into dollar terms. This monetization process 
has proven controversial, difficult, and sometimes impossible. 110  Scholars have 
thoroughly debated this point and a review of the details of this debate will not 
contribute much to the elucidation of a positive theory of environmental law as a 
whole.111 The main point for positive theory is simply that CBA creates analytical 
burdens surpassing those of combining the burdens associated with effects-based 
standards with the burdens encountered in establishing technology-based standards.  
 
3.  Normative Underpinning 
 
Although the core normative theory that one might imagine underpins cost-
benefit based standard setting appears clear enough, specifying the positive theory 
underlying its place in environmental law proves difficult. Most scholars associate 
CBA with allocative efficiency—the idea that policy makers should require an 																																																								
108 Cf. Thomas O. McGarity, The Cost of Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions, in 
ECONOMIC THOUGHT, supra note 20, at 213, 217–19 (pointing out that some economy-wide 
cost estimates for greenhouse gas reduction use “top-down” approaches that base prediction 
on past macroeconomic behavior rather than technological capability).  
109 See McGarity & Ruttenberg, supra note 84, at 2003 (discussing EPA guidance for 
CBA’s reliance on studies of pollution control costs in “representative factories”).  
110 See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the Problem of 
Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 100–01 (2016) (showing that 
between 2010 and 2013 government agencies fully quantified the costs and benefits of only 
two rules and could not quantify any benefits in 36 rules); See, e.g., Ackerman & Heinzerling, 
supra note 8 (describing the difficulty in monetizing ecological effects); Clive L. Spash & 
Alex Y. Lo, Australia’s Carbon Tax: A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing?, 23 ECON. & LAB. REL. 
REV. 67, 67–69 (2016) (characterizing calculation of climate disruption’s “monetary costs 
and benefits” as “impossible”). 
111 See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 55–59 (1993); 
MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
1–7 (1988); Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Our Future, 34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 39, 40–
41 (1999); Lisa Heinzerling, Quality Control: A Reply to Professor Sunstein, 102 CAL. L. 
REV. 1457, 1465–67 (2014) (criticizing an effort to quantify the value of rape); John M. 
Heyde, Is Contingent Valuation Worth the Trouble, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 331 (1995); Douglas 
Kysar, Discounting . . . on Stilts, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 119–20 (2007); Richard L. Revesz, 
Environmental Law, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Life, 99 COLUM. 
L. REV. 941, 955–86 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 
92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 841–42 (1994).  
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efficient level of pollution control defined as a level that generates equal costs and 
benefits at the margin.112 The idea of allocative efficiency treats a pollution control 
decision, not as protection from serious harm, but as the purchase of an 
environmental benefit. And it reflects a concern that we not pay too much for this 
benefit.  
Environmental law, however, does not endorse the pursuit of allocative 
efficiency as a goal, as the cases and executive orders creating obligations to carry 
out CBA do not set up a cost-benefit equilibrium as an explicit goal for standards.113 
The current executive order on CBA, for example, demands “to the extent permitted 
by law” that regulatory benefits “justify” regulatory costs.114 The executive order 
also references the allocative efficiency test, admonishing agencies to choose 
“regulatory approaches” that “maximize net benefits.”115 The reference to regulatory 
approaches, however, suggests that this efficiency criterion applies not to goal 
setting, but to choices about the means of environmental protection. Furthermore, 
this subsection of the executive order defines costs and benefits to include 
“distributive impacts . . . and equity,” thereby clearly rejecting establishment of a 
pure allocative efficiency test.116  
The positive law of CBA suggests a demand that the costs of environmental 
actions should not greatly exceed the benefits. The Supreme Court has endorsed this 
test, and it comports with the executive order’s main test¾the benefits-justify-costs 
test.117 It also aligns with a view of congressional intent with respect to FIFRA that 																																																								
112  See, e.g., Angelo, supra note 67, at 121 (characterizing CBA as “elevat[ing] 
economic efficiency above all other considerations”); Sinden, supra note 6, at 104 
(associating CBA with identifying the “point at which marginal costs just equal marginal 
benefits”). 
113 See, e.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. 208, 217, 224 (2009) (finding that 
the EPA did not seek equilibrium but employed a “significantly greater than” standard in 
analyzing costs and benefits in a rulemaking predicated on CBA); EPA v. Nat’l Crushed 
Stone Ass’n, 449 U.S. 64, 71 n.10 (1980) (citing CWA legislative history suggesting that 
cost-benefit analysis may identify situations where benefits would be “wholly out of 
proportion to the costs”); National Ass’n of Homebuilders v. EPA, 682 F.3d 1032, 1039 
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that EPA does not have a duty under TSCA to show that its rule’s 
benefits “outweigh” its costs even though it conducted a CBA); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 
590 F.2d 1011, 1041 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that Congress rejected the concept of 
optimal pollution control even under a statutory provision requiring a comparison between 
costs and effluent reduction benefits). 
114 Exec. Order No. 13,563 §1(b)(1), 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 (January 18, 2011).  
115 Id. §1(b)(3). 
116 Id.  
117  See Entergy, 556 U.S. at 224–25 (approving a normative criterion precluding 
regulation generating compliance costs “significantly greater” than benefits); see also Ass’n 
of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 805 (9th Cir. 1980) (promulgating the best 
practicable technology standards under the Clean Water Act EPA may only rely on a cost-
benefit comparison to relax a standard when “costs are wholly disproportionate to effluent 
reduction” benefits); Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 
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reads its cost-benefit language as only tolerating reasonably adverse effects when 
“overriding benefits” exist—such as controlling pests that no safer pesticide could 
possibly control.118 
This gross disproportion principle differs from the effects-based principle, as it 
would allow serious harms to the environment or public health if wholly preventing 
such harms proved disproportionately costly. It also differs from the feasibility 
principle because it would permit serious environmental harms even when 
preventing them would not lead to widespread plant shutdowns. Notice that this test, 
however, does not function as a stand-alone test. It only constitutes a restraint on 
stringency and never demands that regulators address environmental hazards at all. 
By contrast, the other tests, and the allocative efficiency principle not found in 
environmental law, would demand some sort of minimum stringency.119 As a result, 
this gross disproportion principle does not govern goal setting on its own, but sets 
up a restraint on other more complete normative criteria. 
Some analysts may object to this identification of the gross disproportion 
principle as the standard found in the positive law on CBA on the ground that OIRA 
in practice imposes a much stricter test. It may well insist that costs not exceed 
quantified benefits even in the face of important unquantified benefits or even 
demand a reverse showing, that benefits far outweigh costs.120 But this Article does 
																																																								
667 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (reading the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) 
as requiring a “reasonable relationship” between a standard’s costs and its benefits); cf. Am. 
Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 506–11 (1981) (rejecting argument that OSHA 
requires a reasonable relationship between costs and benefits); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE 
COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION 21, 120 (2002) 
(identifying the benefits-justify-costs test with costs not exceeding benefits in most cases but 
commending a judicial test based on cost not being grossly disproportionate to benefits). 
118 See Angelo, supra note 67, at 176–77 (explaining the support for this reading in 
FIFRA’s legislative history); see, e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998, 1005–12 
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (upholding a decision to suspend some applications of a pesticide and not 
others based primarily on the availability of safer substitutes for some applications); In re 
Protexall Products, Inc., 2 E.A.D. 854 (E.P.A. July 26, 1989) (approving cancellation of a 
pesticide when applicant could not prove that the pesticide’s benefits justified the health risks 
because it could not show any benefit not provided by safer pesticides); In re Chapman 
Chem. Co., 1 E.A.D. 199 (E.P.A. February 17, 1976) (finding a pesticide’s risks outweigh 
its benefits in applications where safer pesticides performed the same function, but that its 
benefits outweigh the risks where it performed functions not performed by safer pesticides).  
119 See Livermore & Revesz, supra note 15, at 1234–46 (showing that optimal pollution 
levels for many NAAQS are often more stringent than the level EPA identifies as health 
protective).  
120 See Daniel H. Cole, Law, Politics, and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 64 ALA. L. REV. 55, 
74–81 (2012) (concluding that a CBA showing only modest net benefits from a strengthened 
ozone standard likely contributed to OIRA opposition and Obama administration 
abandonment of the proposed standard); David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335, 364–71 (2006) (showing that OIRA almost never 
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not aim to capture every nuance or even the prevailing pattern of agency practice. It 
seeks to identify the aspirations found in positive law—the value choices top-level 
policy makers, like legislatures, courts, and Presidents, have embedded in the law 
that they create.  
Indeed, by way of a caveat, if we lower our gaze from the law’s positive ideals 
to actual administrative practice we will paint a very different and much more 
muddled picture than this Article presents. For example, one might object to this 
Article’s articulation of the feasibility principle on the ground that agencies in 
practice use technology-based rulemaking to enact a political compromise based on 
some unarticulated judgment about what advances the ball but is not too costly. And 
one may object to the description of health-based standards on the ground that 
agencies do not seriously seek to fully protect public health and the environment, 
but rather to make incremental progress based on what they imagine would be 
sensible, considering a variety of technical and political variables.121 Although a 
thorough description of what administrative entities actually do might be of interest 
for a variety of reasons, it does little to clarify the law’s fundamental normative and 
analytical commitments because agency decisions often reflect a muddled response 
to a range of political, legal, and technical considerations. 122  The fundamental 
commitments found in statutes, court decisions, and executive orders provide the 
basis for a positive theory of law, which identifies its aspirations, even if the practice 
does not live up to any particular ideal. These commitments also provide an 
important basis for debating fundamental legal reforms and for critiquing agency 
practice.123  
One might object to my exclusion of agency decisions as a source of positive 
law on CBA’s goal on the ground that agency decision making does create law. The 
law agencies create, however, does not articulate goals; it establishes requirements 
that appear in the Code of Federal Regulations. The preambles that appear in a 
Federal Register notice could in theory announce some principles for application of 
																																																								
advocates more stringent rules and seeks to weaken rules even when CBA does not show 
that they are too costly).  
121 See, e.g., John S. Applegate & Steven M. Wesloh, Short Changing Short-Term Risk, 
A Study of Superfund Remedy Selection, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 269, 302 (1998) (finding that 
EPA ignores risks arising from use of remedial technology under CERLA, even though the 
statute specifically requires it to take them into account); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. 
(NRDC) v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding that the EPA has substituted 
a feasibility finding for a finding of what level of emission protects public health under an 
effects-based provision). 
122 See, e.g., McCubbin, supra note 57, at 23 (describing EPA’s BAT setting in practice 
as “a value-laden political judgment to be made by EPA policymakers”). 
123 See, e.g., NRDC, 824 F.2d at 1163 (reversing EPA’s decision to base regulation of 
a hazardous air pollutant on feasibility when the statute requires it to protect public health). 
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CBA. But Federal Register notices only do so rarely if at all.124 Moreover, preambles 
in the federal register do not themselves establish law binding any private party or 
agency, even though courts use them to help evaluate the legality of an agency’s 
decisions and to interpret the rules themselves.125  
The law does not articulate the criterion underlying CBA as clearly as the 
criteria underlying effects-based and technology-based standard setting. But the 
principle of avoiding disproportionate costs appears congruent with the little law we 
have on this. 
 
D.  Insights and Research Questions Respecting Goals 	
This part cashes out the promise that considering environmental law’s goals 
together yields some fruit. It first shows how these criteria illuminate entire statutes 
and even the corpus of environmental law as a whole. It then reviews some of the 
insights the juxtaposition of competing goals reveals and identifies research 
questions, including normative questions that arise from an understanding of these 
goals’ role in environmental law. 
 
1.  Goals and Environmental Law’s Structure 
 
Although environmental statutes combine goal-setting provisions in various 
ways, a structural analysis reveals some patterns that suggest more coherence than 
seems evident from just listing three competing types of goals. First of all, the major 
media-specific laws—the CAA, CWA, and RCRA—embrace an overarching goal 
of protecting the environment and public health, not a goal of achieving some sort 
of balance between environmental protection and other values. Yet, many of the 
statutory provisions governing regulation of particular groups of polluting facilities 
embrace the feasibility principle. Provisions maximizing feasible reductions usually 
serve as a step toward meeting the goal of fully protecting people from serious health 
and environmental effects.126 Thus, for example, the CWA directs EPA to impose 
an array of technology-based standards on major pollution sources, culminating in 																																																								
124 Cf. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,576, 41,594 
(July 9, 2004) (providing for site-specific technological adjustments when the otherwise 
required technology generates costs “significantly greater than the benefits”).  
125  Compare Wyeth v. Levin, 555 U.S. 555, 623 (2009) (holding that an agency 
regulation, but not its statements in the preamble, have the force of law), with Se. Alaska 
Conservation Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 486 F.3d 638, 649 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(using contemporaneous explanations of regulations to interpret them), rev’d and remanded 
on other grounds sub nom. Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 
261 (2009), and New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (using preamble 
statements to inform judgment about whether EPA’s rule was a reasonable interpretation of 
the Clean Air Act). 
126 Cf. McGarity, supra note 21, at 545 (describing Congress as demanding that EPA 
achieve different goals simultaneously).  
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the BAT provision that conforms to the feasibility principle. 127  But it further 
contemplates state programs to generate additional reductions if needed to meet state 
water quality standards. Similarly, the CAA requires federal technology-based 
standards for new stationary sources and vehicles along with state technology-based 
standards for major existing stationary sources of the pollutants governed by the 
NAAQS.128 But states must supplement these standards with additional rules if 
needed to meet the effects-based NAAQS.129  
The Courts gave cost-benefit considerations primacy in statutes, namely 
FIFRA and TSCA, that contemplate bans of substances that we manufacture in order 
to provide benefits to consumers or producers.130 These statutes do not only aim to 
simply control unsought pollution byproducts of productive processes, as the media-
specific statutes with overarching environmental effects-based goals do.131 Instead, 
they authorize outlawing some productive processes outright. 132  Thus, bringing 
together core understandings of goal setting in environmental law with a basic 
inquiry into how the law combines these goals reveals a lot about environmental 
law’s normative structure. 
 
2.  Insights and Research Questions with Respect to Normative Values 
 
The pattern described above gives rise to an important question: What is the 
best possible normative justification for this pattern? Without trying to answer this 
question (which merits an entire article), it will help to review the state of existing 
scholarship on the normative value of various environmental goals, which provides 
the building blocks for addressing this question. This analysis suggests that although 
we have some theory explaining the normative commitments in our environmental 
statutes, we have some big gaps on very fundamental questions about the goals 
creating the normative structure identified above. These gaps may reflect the lack of 
a reasonably comprehensive positive theory, which may, in turn, stem from a 
tendency within the field to focus on technocratic questions about analytical 
technique and contemporary issues arising under individual statutes.  
  
																																																								
127  See, e.g., Ass’n of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 801 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(describing the sequence of best practicable control technology to BAT regulation for fish 
processing plants).  
128 See 42 U.S.C.A §§ 7411, 7502(c)(1), 7521 (West 2016). 
129 42 U.S.C.A § 7410 (West 2016). 
130 See McGarity, supra note 21, at 537 (describing TSCA and FIFRA as “licensing 
statutes” because they authorize bans of chemicals).  
131 See Angelo, supra note 67, at 183 (suggesting that a technology-based approach 
may not work when the intended use of a product causes the risk prompting regulatory 
consideration). 
132 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A § 2605(2)(A) (West 2016).  
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(a)  Protecting Public Health and the Environment 
 
We have very little work attempting to justify giving primacy to health or 
environmental considerations through effects-based goals. Indeed, some scholars 
find these goals either undesirable or unrealistic.133 Some CBA advocates, however, 
have suggested that a justification may exist for treating protection of endangered 
species or the avoidance of human premature death as special cases not amenable to 
standard cost-benefit balancing.134 Those suggestions invite the question of what 
exactly justifies those conclusions. One might also ask whether the rationales for 
accepting a rights-based approach to protecting some limited environmental impacts 
might properly extend to other impacts—such as serious illness or destruction of 
unique ecosystems—or even to environmental protection as a whole.  
Amy Sinden has articulated a political economy justification for effects-based 
standards. In her article, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power 
in Environmental Law,135 she argues that the power of industry to influence standard 
setting justifies cost-blind effects-based environmental law.136 In her account, this 
power sufficiently tempers environmental law even when statutes do not authorize 
consideration of cost.137 Keeping cost out of the formal equation serves to put a 
thumb on the balance beam in favor of environmental protection, which will likely 
produce a more appropriate balance than would be obtained if cost were explicitly 
considered and then industry applied its lobbying muscle to exaggerate costs and use 
arguments about cost to inappropriately weaken standards.138  
A related political economy justification for effects-based standards involves 
the role of technology-forcing in environmental law. In explaining the absolutism of 
the CAA’s overall goals, the Supreme Court famously stated that Congress intended 																																																								
133 See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
233, 233–34 (1990) (characterizing mandates to protect public health as impractical and 
unrealistic symbolic legislation). 
134 See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1697 
(2001) (suggesting that the Endangered Species Act may be based on a “theory of rights,” 
which may make CBA inappropriate); cf. Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death, and Time: A 
Comment on Judge Williams’ Defense of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 271, 272 
(2001) (noting that “death is different” and therefore poses a challenge for CBA), Mark 
Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle that Safety Matters More 
than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114, 116–21 (2001) (acknowledging a principle that treats 
“safety as more important than money” but arguing that it can be reconciled with CBA if 
safety considerations are given added weight). 
135 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (2005). 
136  See id. at 1411–12 (justifying the ESA and NAAQS as correctives to power 
imbalances). 
137 See id. at 1411 (portraying the prohibition on considering costs in the ESA as leading 
to politically negotiated outcomes that are “less protective of species than a literal reading of 
the ESA’s standards might dictate”). 
138 See id. (claiming that the ESA places “a thumb on the scale in favor of the weaker 
party” leading to outcomes “consistent with widely shared public values”). 
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to get industry to do what appears infeasible.139 This statement could be read as 
combining technological optimism with a wariness of what industry would do to a 
statute if cost and technical feasibility were embedded in the statutes’ overall goals. 
Thus, one might justify effects-based standards’ cost blindness pragmatically as an 
attempt to avoid undue industry influence and to realize improvements based on 
faith that industry will prove sufficiently innovative and capable to meet ambitious 
technology-forcing goals without serious negative economic consequences for 
society. Courts often cite this apparent infeasibility statement as evidence that the 
CAA is a technology-forcing statute.140 In any case, technology forcing provides a 
potential political economy justification for effects-based standards. 
Technology-forcing’s role in potentially justifying effects-based standards 
raises a conceptual question about where technology forcing fits in a framework that 
contrasts technology-based standards with effects-based standards. We should 
consider a technology-forcing goal as a type of technology-based goal. A number of 
statutory provisions authorize EPA to develop standards based on the capabilities of 
technologies not yet fully developed.141 These provisions, however, require EPA to 
evaluate future technologies and do not authorize it to demand levels of pollution 
that are impossible to achieve with any imaginable technology, even if such levels 
might be needed to protect public health.142 They do not contemplate consideration 
of what levels of pollution we might tolerate without significant negative effects. On 
the other hand, the possibility of technological innovation in response to health-
based standards, as suggested already, can provide a pragmatic justification for 
ignoring costs in order to protect public health. That is, we might feel more 
comfortable in setting standards that protect public health—standards promulgated 
without evaluation of technologies—because we expect that industry can innovate 
to continue to produce what we would like to have even if we demand full health 																																																								
139 Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 257 (1976) (describing the requirements to 
meet the NAAQS as “technology-forcing” because “they are designed to force regulated 
sources to develop pollution control devices that might at the time appear to be economically 
or technologically infeasible”). 
140 See, e.g., Nat’l Steel Corp., Great Lakes Steel Div. v. Gorsuch, 700 F.2d 314, 325 
(6th Cir. 1983) (citing this statement to justify the conclusion that CAA requirements have a 
“technology-forcing character”). 
141  See, e.g., Bluewater Network v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(characterizing CAA section 213(a)(3) as a “technology-forcing” provision). 
142 This statement assumes a somewhat narrow view of technology. If we view shutting 
down plants as a technology, then a zero level is always achievable. See Union Elec., 427 
U.S. at 265 n.14 (noting that in a literal sense all pollution control plans are feasible, since 
plants can always comply by shutting down). But that is not what technology-based statutory 
provisions envision. See, e.g., Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n v. EPA, 287 F.3d 1130, 
1136 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (framing the issue in reviewing a technology-forcing regulation in 
terms of whether EPA had a reasonable basis for “predicting future success” in development 
of a technology); Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 655 F.2d 318, 327–328 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
(basing conclusions about technological feasibility on predictions about the development of 
a known pollution control technology that could be employed in vehicles). 
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and environmental protection.143 Thus, technological innovation as a possibility 
helps justify the concept of effects-based standards, but an estimate of an identified 
technology’s potential in a given case justifies particular pollution control decisions 
in the context of some technology-based standard setting exercises.144  
The arguments that cost-blindness’ value in overcoming industry resistance 
and taking advantage of unforeseeable technological advancements might provide 
pragmatic justifications for effects-based standards, but they duck a more 
fundamental normative question: Does a philosophical normative justification 
implicit in our law for giving health and environmental considerations primacy 
exist?  
The structural insights offered, however, suggest that the primacy question 
might be more narrowly framed. Is there some justification for effects-based 
standards for media-specific statutes that does not fully extend to statutes that may 
prohibit the use of particular toxic chemicals altogether? 
 
(b)  Maximizing Feasible Reductions 
 
Most scholars endorse technology-based standards as pragmatic because of the 
relative simplicity of the analysis required to set the standards and because they do 
take costs into account in a workable way. 145  My previous work, however, 
articulates a normative justification for the feasibility principle—defending its 
approach to the distribution of cost as a reasonable way of addressing the centrality 
of health and employment to people’s lives, while rejecting the notion that more 
widely distributed cost typically matters enough to merit significant attention.146 
This work defends the centrality of health and employment by employing Martha 
Nussbaum and Armataya Sen’s capabilities’ approach, which focuses on the 
importance of maintaining people’s full capabilities to engage fruitfully in life.147 It 
responds to the equation of cost with wealth reduction even when plants do not close 
by pointing to the emerging literature on happiness to raise doubts about wealth’s 
relationship to human flourishing.148 These justifications for the feasibility principle 
merit more debate and might be usefully considered in light of technology-based 
																																																								
143 See generally Union Elec., 427 U.S. at 265 (affirming that states may attain the 
NAAQS ahead of schedule if they are willing to force technology to bring this result about). 
144 Cf. Livermore & Revesz, supra note 15, at 1257 (noting that technology-forcing 
cannot justify a particular health-based standard because EPA may not consider 
technological feasibility in making health-based decisions).  
145 See, e.g., Babich, supra note 19, at 170–183; Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 19, at 
739–744; Wagner, supra note 19, at 88–107. 
146 See Driesen, supra note 19, at 34–40. 
147 See David M. Driesen, Two Cheers for Feasible Regulation: A Modest Response to 
Masur and Posner, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 321–326 (2011); cf. Masur & Posner, 
supra note 19 (criticizing feasibility analysis). 
148 See Driesen, supra note 147, at 325 (discussing the lack of correlation between 
increased wealth and happiness). 
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regulation’s role as a step toward full protection of public health and the environment 
in many statutes. 
 
(c)  Restraining Disproportionately Costly Regulation 
 
Surprisingly, nobody has articulated a normative justification for the principle 
that costs should not grossly exceed benefits. A normative theory that adequately 
addressed this question in light of a positive theory of environmental law’s means 
and ends more generally would have to address the question of whether widely 
dispersed costs should matter when the “benefits” involve avoiding such drastic 
concentrated losses as death or serious illness. Thus, the positive theory identifies 
new questions and arguments about cost-benefit balancing.  
This lacuna in the scholarship appears surprising because a rich literature seeks 
to justify CBA’s role in environmental law. This literature, however, focuses 
overwhelmingly on claims that bypass fundamental normative questions, as Kysar 
has pointed out.149 Thus, proponents have argued that CBA enhances rationality,150 
facilitates political control of rulemaking,151 and serves democracy by counteracting 
hysterical fears.152 I do not mean to dismiss the importance of these arguments by 
highlighting their failure to address the fundamental normative question of why the 
particular balance sought in environmental law constitutes a good goal.  
Matthew Adler and Eric Posner, however, have sought to establish a normative 
foundation for CBA by developing a concept of overall well-being.153 The concept 
of overall well-being has a lot in common with allocative efficiency, but it rejects a 
complete reliance on consumer preferences as revealed in purchase decisions as the 
basis for assessing costs and benefits.154 Traditionally, economic theory has treated 
what people are willing to pay for goods and services (or willing to accept to part 																																																								
149 See KYSAR, supra note 9, at x (arguing that “dominant ways of thinking about 
environmental law . . . aspire to objectivity” and thereby mask fundamental questions about 
our responsibilities).  
150  See RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: 
HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 
12 (2008) (characterizing CBA as “a requirement of basic rationality”). 
151 See Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive 
Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (2001) (positing that CBA 
facilitates political control by the President and Congress under some common conditions). 
152 See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 
51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 685–91 (1999) (offering CBA as an antidote to “mass delusions”).  
153  See MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS FOR COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS 6–8 (2006); see also MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR 
DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 155–159 (2012) (further developing the 
overall well-being concept). 
154 See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 
YALE L.J. 165, 177 (1999) (rejecting reliance on “unrestricted preferences” as “implausible 
and unnecessary”). 
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with goods and services they possess) as a measurement of goods and services’ 
value. 155  Environmental CBA seeks, through various techniques, to apply this 
concept to the public goods that environmental protection provides—such as 
protection of health and ecosystems.156 Adler and Posner, however, recognize that 
sometimes people do not know what is good for them.157 It would be odd, for 
example, to treat the high price paid for heroin as a measure of its great positive 
value. So, they base overall well-being on a concept of measuring people’s “desires” 
in ways that “launder” preferences, i.e., to clean out perverse preferences.158 This 
brief summary cannot do full justice to their work, but it suffices to ground further 
discussion of how a positive theory might inform future work on cost-benefit 
balancing’s normative foundations. Although intended as a normative theory, it 
offers a plausible positive theory as well, which might explain the actual normative 
basis for current law on cost-benefit balancing.159  
Still, Adler and Posner’s concept of overall well-being, whatever its value for 
normative theory, establishes such a general goal that its utility for positive 
theory¾justifying a specific norm guiding CBA’s use¾ becomes hard to see. To 
be a little more precise, their theory does not foreclose the possibility that overall 
well-being requires the preservation of human life at any cost.160 Their theory is 
capacious enough to accept a health-based criterion for a pollutant killing people or 
to instead demand some sort of unspecified tradeoff between the benefit of 
preserving life and the cost of doing so.161 In spite of this problem, future work might 
consider whether the concept of overall well-being, or some new variant of it, 
supports the criterion found in the law of CBA, the idea that costs should not greatly 
outweigh benefits. I suspect that Adler and Posner would say it does, but it is hard 
to see why that would always be true in light of Adler’s recognition that preservation 
of life poses challenges for CBA, as many people will not be willing to accept a 
payment (at any price) to allow polluters to kill them.162  																																																								
155 See id. at 220. 
156  See Sinden, supra note 6, at 105–107 (discussing various methods of valuing 
environmental benefits based on individual preferences). 
157 See Adler & Posner, supra note 154, at 203–04 (discussing ways in which a person’s 
preferences may not advance well-being). 
158 See id. at 246 (claiming that CBA may have to be adjusted to reflect distorted 
preferences).  
159 See Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: A Welfarist Theory of 
Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 241, 327 (2000) (arguing that regulatory agencies 
generally deviate from the unrestricted preference-based view of welfare).  
160 See Adler, supra note 134, at 272 (explaining why the rational for CBA may break 
down for actions involving death). 
161 See Driesen, supra note 19, at 70–71 (explaining why the overall well-being does 
not rule out giving primacy to avoiding death and destruction of species). 
162 See David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond 
Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 545, 590 (1997) (noting that many 
people might not be willing to accept a payment to give up a right to be free from pollution 
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So, in spite of the reams of ink spilled over CBA, we still have work to do on 
providing a normative justification for a goal that costs should not greatly outweigh 
benefits. Part of the problem stems from the regulatory reform literature’s tendency 
to focus on the analytical technique of CBA, rather than a specific cost-benefit 
criterion. Indeed, CBA scholars often fail to specify what criterion they have in mind 
or embrace several different criteria at once. 163  This makes normative debate 
difficult. 
 
3.  On the Relationship Between Norms and Analysis 
 
The positive theory developed here has a structure that suggests a fundamental 
problem with focusing normative theory on an analytical technique. The theory 
developed here focuses normative explanation on statutory goals and the criteria 
governing standard setting—the goals of environmental law—not on the analytical 
technique employed to craft standards designed to achieve those goals. It treats the 
analytical techniques as an implication of the goal choice. Thus, for example, if one 
believes that ethics and morality require that public health and environmental 
protection have absolute priority, then one should not consider costs in crafting 
environmental standards, and therefore CBA becomes an inappropriate technique. 
Similarly, if one thinks that health and environmental benefits should have primacy 
except when the costs of that primacy have devastating effects on employment, then 
feasibility analysis, not CBA, makes sense. On the other hand, if one embraces the 
proposition that costs should not greatly outweigh benefits, even when the benefits 
accrue to public health or the environment, then some sort of comparison between 
costs and benefits becomes an essential technique.  
This approach to the relationship between goals and analytical technique 
comports with common sense and central tenets of administrative law. 
Administrators must make a lot of decisions, and they should choose a form of 
analysis that fits the particular decision they have to make without wasting resources 
generating a lot of irrelevant analysis, while carefully considering all information 
made relevant by the statutory mandates they operate under. The statutory criteria 
found in environmental statutes represent elected representatives’ decisions about 
the goals of environmental law. The legislature implements its normative values, in 
part, by specifying the factors agencies should consider in making decisions. For 
that reason, consideration of factors not included in germane statutory provisions, or 
neglect of factors included, constitutes arbitrary and capricious rulemaking. 164 																																																								
threatening their health); cf. ADLER, supra note 134, at 272 (recognizing that the price a 
person might be willing to accept for her own death might be infinite).  
163  See Driesen, supra note 120, at 341–42, 387–94 (discussing CBA proponents’ 
“indeterminate position” that says nothing about criteria and several criteria sometimes 
advocated). 
164 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 43 (1983) (forbidding consideration of factors Congress had not intended the agency to 
consider); cf. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (holding that cost is a relevant 
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Agencies must confine their analysis to the factors made relevant in governing law 
to remain faithful to the goals elected officials have chosen when they delegated 
authority to make these sorts of decisions.165  
Debates about analytical technique, however, remain important on pragmatic 
grounds. Daniel Farber, Robert Glicksman, and Sidney Shapiro have developed 
theories of eco-pragmatism, which link environmental law to the philosophical 
tradition of American pragmatism.166 They tend to like technology-based regulation, 
partly because feasibility analysis proves much simpler than competing forms of 
analysis.167 In evaluating this preference, however, it remains useful to consider 
norms and analytical technique separately. If one finds the norms underlying 
technology-based regulation attractive, then the advantage of relatively simple 
analytical technique seals the deal. But those, like Eric Posner and Jonathan Masur, 
who find the feasibility principle unattractive, may find the complexity of CBA 
worth putting up with in order to arrive at a better normative place (in their view).168 
My main point is that the tendency of us technocratic lawyers to focus on analytical 
technique may obscure normative questions. On the other hand, those most 
dedicated to particular norms still need to see that questions of analytical technique 
matter to how law functions in practice and should not too readily assume that law 
can cope with infinite analytical complexity. 
 
4.  On Precaution 
 
Kysar’s book, Regulating from Nowhere, focuses heavily on a defense of the 
precautionary principle, which Cass Sunstein and others have heavily criticized.169 
This Article will not join the debate about the precautionary principle’s value. But it 
will prove useful to situate the precautionary principle in this discussion of 
																																																								
factor that EPA must consider in deciding whether regulation of power plant mercury 
emissions is “necessary and appropriate”). 
165  Cf. RICHARDSON, supra note 23, at 159–90 (constructing a model where an 
individual is free to refine her view of her own ends to resolve conflicts among them in 
particular cases).  
166  See DANIEL FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL 
DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 10 (1999); SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. 
GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 49–53 
(2003).  
167 See FARBER, supra note 166, at 9–14; SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 166, at 
46–72.  
168 See Masur & Posner, supra note 19, at 699–712 (explaining in detail why they 
dislike the feasibility principle and suggesting that cost-benefit balancing is better). 
169 KYSAR, supra note 9, at 19 (characterizing the precautionary principle as “well 
suited to safeguarding life and the environmental under conditions of uncertainty and 
ignorance”); see, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS 31 (2007); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1008 (2003). 
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environmental law’s goals, as it constitutes an important piece of the fragmented 
positive theory puzzle.170 
The precautionary principle rejects postponing cost effective action on 
significant environmental problems based on scientific uncertainty.171  Its critics 
have castigated it for not usefully guiding standard setting decisions.172 In other 
words, they fault it for not stating a specific goal. The theory developed here 
describes the principles that guide goal setting and imply a question about where the 
precautionary principle fits within this framework.  
The primary use of the precautionary principle does not implicate goals. The 
courts and commentators have emphasized the precautionary principle’s role as a 
trigger.173 That is, before one can decide what sorts of standards to set for particular 
pollutants, one must decide which pollutants pose a sufficient danger to merit any 
regulatory attention at all. The precautionary principle helps guide this decision, 
permitting policy-makers to list pollutants for regulatory decisions before we have 
complete knowledge about their effects.174 A prominent example comes from the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 175  which required EPA to 
determine whether greenhouse gases endanger public health or the environment 
under a precautionary approach.176 Once EPA did determine that greenhouse gases 
pose a serious risk, it had to regulate them, but did so primarily under statutory 
provisions that do not call for reconsidering the risks involved, but instead, demand 
rules mandating technologically feasible emission reductions.177 																																																								
170 See, e.g., KYSAR, supra note 9, at 12 (describing the precautionary principle as “one 
aspect of a much more elaborate regulatory process”); Christopher D. Stone, Is There a 
Precautionary Principle?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,790 (2001). 
171 See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc.A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. 1), Annex 
1, Princ. 15 (August 22, 1992). Although this constitutes a leading and oft-reiterated 
statement of the precautionary principle, statements of the principle vary. See 20TH CENTURY 
PRECAUTION, supra note 20, at 6; James E. Hickey, Jr. & Vern R. Walker, Refining the 
Precautionary Principle in International Environmental Law, 14 VA. J. ENVTL. L. 423, 432–
36 (1995) (collecting statements of the principle in international legal instruments).  
172 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 169, at 131; Todd J. Zywicki, Baptists?: The Political 
Economy of Environmental Interest Groups, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 333 (2002); 
Stone, supra note 170, at 10,799.  
173 See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 6–7 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (defining 
the issue as whether EPA may regulate lead based on a finding of a significant risk of harm). 
174 See id. at 9, 13 (characterizing the statutory endangerment trigger as precautionary 
and explaining the lack of certainty about leaded gasoline’s effects). 
175 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
176 Id. at 532–34 (rejecting a host of policy arguments against regulating greenhouse 
gases and directing EPA to simply determine whether these gases endanger public health or 
the environment). 
177 See, e.g., Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,851 (June 18, 2014) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R pt. 60) (proposing a power plant rule for existing sources under the technology-
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Yet, most scholars accept a role for precaution in standard setting as well, 
implying that it has some relevance to setting goals.178 Its most obvious application 
takes place when regulators establish effects-based standards. The precautionary 
principle implies a conservative approach to risk assessment in setting standards 
designed to protect the environment or public health.179  
Scholars also sometimes identify technology-based standards as 
precautionary.180 They may simply mean that technology-based standards do not 
conflict with precaution, as they do not use scientific uncertainty as a basis for 
postponing cost effective measures. The theory sketched above, though, suggests 
that precaution does not provide much guidance to agencies setting technology-
based standards because science about environmental effects should not influence 
these standards. Therefore, a cautious attitude toward risk assessment is not relevant 
to technology-based standard setting. Rather, the relevant question becomes what 
can we achieve with feasible technological improvements. One might ask whether 
precaution can play a role in justifying technology-based criteria as a goal choice 
even if it should play no role in crafting standards under technology-based 
provisions. 
The conventional wisdom holds that cost-benefit balancing conflicts with 
precaution. But the framework sketched above calls that wisdom into doubt.181 For 
the framework identifies risk assessment as common to both effects-based and cost-
benefit-based standard setting. If regulators establishing cost-benefit based 
standards adopt a precautionary approach to the risk assessment underlying CBA 
and toward the treatment of unquantified benefits, then they presumably have 
conformed to the precautionary principle. For the precautionary principle seems to 																																																								
based section 111 of the CAA); Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 1430, 1443–
44 (Jan. 8, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R pts. 60, 71–72, 98) (proposing a power plant 
rule for new sources under the technology-based section 111 of the CAA); Proposed 
Rulemaking to Establish Light-duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74 Fed. Reg. 49,454, 49,461 (Sept. 28, 2009) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86, 600) (summarizing technology-based statutory provisions 
providing the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from cars and light trucks); see 
generally Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 114, 116–126 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012), rev’d on other grounds, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) (upholding EPA’s finding that 
greenhouse gases endanger public health and the environment). 
178 See David M. Driesen, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Precautionary Principle: Can 
They Be Reconciled?, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 771, 789 (2013) (stating that many scholars 
think that the precautionary principle has something to say about levels of standards). 
179 See id. at 798.  
180 See, e.g., Nigel Haigh, The Introduction of the Precautionary Principle into the UK, 
in INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 224, 241 (Timothy O’Riordan & James 
Cameron eds., 1994) (pointing out that the precautionary principle is often seen as 
synonymous with basing regulation on technical feasibility).  
181 See, e.g., APPLEGATE, supra note 20, at 171 (characterizing CBA as “an alternative” 
to the precautionary principle); Stone, supra note 170, at 10796 (claiming that the 
precautionary principle demands a curtailment of CBA once a harm threshold is reached).  
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allow governments to reject pollution control standards on the ground that they cost 
too much; it only eliminates scientific uncertainty as a basis for rejecting standards. 
On the other hand, CBA that ignores important unquantified benefits or treats 
uncertainty as a reason to devalue pollution control’s benefits would violate the 
principle.  
Cost-benefit balancing may conflict with a normative judgment about the 
primacy society should give to protection of public health and the environment, and 
a similar normative judgment may underlie the precautionary principle. But that 
does not mean that CBA violates the precautionary principle itself. The normative 
justification for the precautionary principle and for rejecting CBA must be closely 
related to the justification for effects-based standards. For a decision to be 
conservative about targeted health and environmental risks, rather than, say the 
economic effects of spending money on pollution control, implies giving primacy to 
public health and the environment. Thus, further work on justifying health and 
effects-based standards would also contribute to a normative defense of the 
precautionary principle. 
 
5.  A Brief Summary of Payoffs 
 
Thus, we see that a precise systematic understanding of environmental goals 
on a very basic level yields important insights into environmental law as a whole 
and reveals a valuable research agenda. It helps reveal environmental law’s 
underlying structure. It yields a series of questions about the normative justification 
for the structure and its components. It also highlights some pragmatic 
considerations about analytical technique and invites us to think more about the 
relationship between pragmatism and normative philosophy. Finally, it helps us 
understand the role of precaution in environmental law.  
 
II.  THE MEANS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
Government agencies and regulated firms have a variety of tools at their 
disposal to achieve environmental standards, i.e. to meet society’s goals for 
environmental law. Much of the scholarship about instrument choice—government 
choices about the regulatory means of environmental protection—has a goal of 
promoting the use of economic incentives, especially emissions trading, rather than 
of analyzing or explaining existing law.182 This Article uses the term “emissions 																																																								
182 See Sanja Bogojević, Ending the Honeymoon: Deconstructing Emissions Trading 
Discources, 21 J. ENVTL. L. 443, 447 (2009) (describing the emissions trading literature as 
having a “promotional” rather than an analytic nature). The rationale for referring to an 
emissions trading program as an economic incentive program is not entirely clear either. See 
David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Beyond the 
Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 289 
(1998) [hereinafter Emissions Trading]. Trading proponents tend to think of it these days as 
putting a price on pollution. See David M. Driesen, Putting a Price on Carbon: The 
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trading” in a broad sense to include any program that allows for trading of 
environmental benefits, a usage consistent with that found in the promotional 
literature on instrument choice. This promotional scholarship has proven quite 
successful, so that now any discussion of positive law must include emissions 
trading, as it plays an important, increasing role in environmental protection.183 This 
scholarship, however, has sometimes demonized other means of meeting 
environmental goals, lumping many of them together with technology-based goal 
setting under the very imprecise rubric of “command-and-control” regulation.184 
This approach may have been useful when emissions trading struggled to achieve a 
place in environmental law and policy. But at this juncture, a positive theory of the 
means of environmental protection would add much needed clarity to the debate 
about instrument choice, greatly contribute to an emerging third generation debate 
on instrument design, and prompt a new discussion of the relationship between 
means and ends.  
This part begins with a treatment of traditional regulation—performance 
standards, work practice standards, and phaseouts. It then continues with a 
discussion of emissions trading and pollution taxes.  
This account focuses solely on legal means that regulators use to achieve 
particular environmental goals, such as the goals elaborated above, thereby 
facilitating a discussion of the relationship of means to ends in part three. This 
narrow approach makes the topic of means and ends manageable and facilitates 
concise and coherent analysis of the relationship between them. Yet it leaves out 
other aspects of environmental law that can be thought of as means of environmental 
protection. Specifically, it leaves out legal mechanisms that encourage 
environmental improvements without aiming at specific goals, namely 
informational approaches and liability. It also does not specifically focus on 																																																								
Metaphor, 44 ENVTL. L. 695, 696 (2014) (discussing the recent rhetorical shift that treats 
emissions trading to reduce greenhouse gas emissions as “putting a price on carbon”). But a 
traditional regulation does that as well. See Todd Gerarden, Richard G. Newell, & Robert N. 
Stavins, Deconstructing the Energy-Efficiency Gap: Conceptual Frameworks and Evidence, 
105 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS AND PROC. 183, 184 (2015) (noting that regulation directly or 
indirectly prices environmental externalities). 
183 See David M. Driesen, Alternatives to Regulation? Market Mechanisms and the 
Environment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 203, 209–215 (Robert Baldwin, 
Martin Cave, & Martin Lodge eds., 2010) [hereinafter OXFORD HANDBOOK] (describing the 
increased use of trading over time). 
184  See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 25, at 1334–39 (treating “serious 
inefficiency of . . . command-and-control regulation” as evidence that a strategy of requiring 
installation of available technology wastes money); Daniel J. Dudek & John Palmisano, 
Emissions Trading: Why Is this Thoroughbred Hobbled?, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217, 220 
(1988) (equating “command-and-control” with “technology forcing”); see also Andrew 
McFee Thompson, Comment, Free Market Environmentalism and the Common Law: 
Confusion, Nostalgia and Inconsistency, 45 EMORY L.J. 1329, 1336 (1996) (characterizing 
“free market advocates” as offering only two, diametrically opposed options: “command and 
control” regulation and a “market-dominated system”). 
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technological approaches that polluters can use to protect the environment, namely 
end-of-the-pipe controls, pollution prevention, and recycling. Much work remains 
to be done on specifying the relationships among these three types of means. But a 
focus on legal means of meeting specified goals facilitates development of a concise 
theory of means and ends. 
 
A.  Traditional Regulation 
 
1.  Performance Standards 
 
The media-specific statutes rely heavily on performance standards as a major 
means of environmental protection. Performance standards, as the name implies, 
demand a particular level of environmental performance. For example, air pollution 
standards for electric utilities typically limit the pounds of a pollutant per British 
Thermal Unit (BTU) of energy produced.185 Thus, performance standards do not 
dictate a technological approach. Formally, at least, they leave polluters free to 
choose whatever technology they wish to employ, as long as their facility or product 
reaches the required pollution control level. Because performance standards offer 
plant operators some flexibility, the pollution control statutes usually require their 
use when pollution levels can be monitored to allow for practical enforcement of a 
performance standard.186 
 
2.  Work Practice Standards 
 
Sometimes, however, agencies promulgate standards that tell polluters how to 
reduce pollution, instead of mandating that they achieve a particular level of 
pollution reduction.187 Let us call these standards work practice standards.188 The 
statutes authorize work practice standards when designing or enforcing a 
																																																								
185 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 60.43Da (West 2016). 
186 See Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (EPA may 
not limit use of ethanol in reformulated gasoline, because the Clean Air Act mandates 
performance standards); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Harrison, 660 F.2d 628, 636 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(authority to set performance standards does not include authority to specify fuels). 
187 See, e.g., Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 277, 294–95 (1978), 
superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (majority and dissenting opinions) (discussing a 
regulation that requires watering down asbestos during building demolition but does not 
specify an emissions limit).  
188 An illustrative statutory provision authorizes promulgation of “design, equipment, 
work practice, or operational standards.” See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. §7412(h) (2016 West). I use 
the term “work practice standard” generically to refer to all of these sorts of prescriptive 
standards. 
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performance standard appears infeasible.189 It is usually not possible to enforce an 
emissions standard when it is impossible to measure the level of pollution.190 
 
3.  Phaseouts 
 
Although rarely employed, environmental statutes do authorize and sometimes 
require phaseouts of hazardous substances. For example, we phased out lead from 
gasoline, many ozone depleting chemicals, and DDT.191 A phaseout resembles, at 
first glance, a very strict performance standard, requiring a zero level of pollution. 
But a performance standard set at zero only eliminates pollution in a single medium. 
A phaseout of a chemical, by contrast, eliminates pollution caused by the production 
and use of the phased-out substance in all media—land, air, and water. 
 
B.  Emissions Trading and Pollution Taxes 
 
Although used sparingly in the United States, economists have long 
recommended pollution taxes as a means of pollution control. Faced with a tax on 
pollution, polluters would presumably pay for pollution control if doing so is 
cheaper than paying the tax. As a result, a tax provides a cost effective means of 
reducing emissions. Those with only expensive pollution abatement opportunities 
would presumably pay the tax instead of reducing emissions. Those with relatively 
inexpensive available pollution abatement possibilities would abate emissions to 
avoid (or reduce) the tax. Other countries have used pollution taxes and the United 
States has made some limited use of fees and taxes that bear some relationship to 
pollution.192 
The United States has made extensive use of another technique for cost 
effective pollution reductions—emissions trading.193 Emissions trading builds on 
the idea of a performance standard, which establishes a quantitative reduction 
obligation. A regulator creating a trading program establishes quantitative limits on 
emissions for regulated pollution sources, but makes the reduction obligations 
tradable. Under such an approach a polluter with an obligation to reduce emissions 																																																								
189 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. §7412(h)(1) (West 2016); cf. 42 U.S.C.A. §6924(m)(1) (West 
2016) (authorizing the EPA to create treatment standards for the disposal of solid waste). 
190 See 42 U.S.C.A. §7412(h)(2) (West 2016); Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 
F.2d 1146, 1157 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that the provision authorizing work practice 
standards for hazardous air pollutants does so only when emissions cannot be measured); 
e.g., Adamo Wrecking, 434 U.S. at 286–87, 298 (majority and dissenting opinion) (noting 
that EPA chose a work practice standard because EPA could not regulate emissions since the 
emissions could not be measured). 
191 42 U.S.C.A §§ 7545(n), 7671c-7671e (West 2016); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 
489 F.2d 1247, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (affirming the DDT ban). 
192 OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 183, at 209 (discussing the use of pollution taxes 
primarily in Europe). 
193 See id. at 210–11 (discussing trading’s growing influence in the US). 
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can avoid this obligation if she pays somebody else to make extra reductions in her 
stead. 194  Given this flexibility, some polluters with relatively cheap abatement 
opportunities will likely provide more reductions than required in order to sell 
credits for the extra reductions to polluters needing credits.195 Conversely, polluters 
facing expensive local abatement costs will likely purchase credits from over-
complying polluters in lieu of local abatement.196 Thus, trading generally facilitates 
cost effective abatement, by permitting reallocation of reduction obligations to those 
with the cheapest pollution abatement opportunities.  
 
C.  Insights 
 
The juxtaposition of the various regulatory means of pollution control aimed at 
specific goals yields some useful insights that help clarify understanding of 
instrument choice and design. First of all, the juxtaposition of performance standards 
and work practice standards highlights the importance of monitoring in instrument 
choice. Simply put, a performance standard offers desirable technological flexibility, 
but does not work as a practical matter when we cannot monitor pollution levels. 
Accordingly, the statutes usually favor performance standards but contemplate 
substituting work practice standards when performance standards appear infeasible.  
Since emissions trading constitutes a variant on a performance standard, it 
follows that emissions trading cannot work properly when we cannot reliably 
monitor emissions. Most emissions trading proponents recognize that measurement 
of emissions proves critical to the enforcement of an emissions trading program and 
therefore do not recommend trading absent reliable monitoring.197 Yet this insight 
has received insufficient attention, as it implies that a standard recommendation that 
regulators should make emissions trading “comprehensive” needs qualification.198 																																																								
194 See Emissions Trading, supra note 182, at 290 (“Emissions trading programs allow 
polluters to avoid pollution reductions at a regulated pollution source, if they provide an 
equivalent reduction elsewhere.”). 
195 See id. at 334 (explaining that emissions trading encourages those with low marginal 
pollution abatement cost to go beyond compliance). 
196  Id. (explaining how those with high marginal control cost may forego local 
abatement and buy credits instead). 
197 See, e.g., Jeffrey C. Fort & Cynthia A. Faur, Can Emissions Trading Work Beyond 
a National Program?: Some Practical Observations on the Available Tools, 18 U. PA. J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 463, 467 (1997) (arguing that trading only works with accurate monitoring); 
Ann Powers, Reducing Nitrogen Pollution on Long Island Sound: Is There a Place for 
Pollution Trading?, 23 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 137, 212 (1998) (characterizing thorough 
monitoring as an essential element of a trading program). 
198 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, The Comprehensive Approach 
to Global Climate Policy: Issues of Design and Practicality, 9 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 83, 
103–108 (1992) (advocating comprehensive trading of greenhouse gases in spite of 
monitoring challenges). Stewart and Wiener argue that “monitoring will be required in order 
to secure compliance with any agreed-on limitations” even without trading. Id. at 108. This 
overlooks several points. First, allowing trading in poorly monitored pollutants can 
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When an environmental problem arises in part from pollutants that cannot be reliably 
monitored, emissions trading schemes probably should focus on those pollutants that 
can be, rather than regulating comprehensively but poorly. Considering all of these 
mechanisms together yields some additional insights along these same lines.  
The observation that trading depends on adequate monitoring invites an inquiry 
into whether other mechanisms depend on adequate monitoring as well. Pollution 
taxes, upon reflection, also depend on adequate monitoring and therefore may prove 
inappropriate where adequate monitoring is not possible.199 If tax authorities cannot 
determine how much pollution is being emitted, they cannot determine the correct 
amount of tax to collect.  
By contrast, a phaseout can function even when pollution cannot be measured. 
A phaseout usually limits the production of a particular substance and one can verify 
compliance with a phaseout without measuring the pollution emitted in a particular 
medium. One need only measure production levels or purchase records to see 
whether a manufacturer has complied with a phaseout requirement. 
This recognition of a phaseout’s ability to function when polluters and 
inspectors cannot monitor pollution levels reveals a potential way around the 
technical limits monitoring weaknesses can place on effective emissions trading 
programs and pollution taxes. Even when regulators cannot measure emissions, they 
can tax or limit production of products causing emissions, and we did this when we 
phased out lead and ozone-depleting chemicals. Production limits can also be made 
tradable. Amy Sinden and I have analyzed the potential of “dirty input limits” 
(DILs), which limit the production of products rather than emissions, to work well 
as an instrument of environmental protection, including tradable DILs.200 
The possibility of phasing-out or limiting the production of products that cause 
pollution might prove useful in addressing the largest environmental problem we 
face, that of global climate disruption. Currently, many policies addressing climate 
disruption focus on emission reductions. Some of these programs prove awkward to 
design and implement, partly because of measurement difficulties.201 DILs might 
prove useful in overcoming these limitations and in facilitating the eventual 
phaseout of fossil fuels that scientists recommend.202  																																																								
compound the effect of monitoring limitations, because exaggerated claims of emission 
reductions can be strategically combined with minimization of debits to create greater losses 
of planned emission reductions. Second, one can circumvent monitoring limitations with 
dirty input limits or work practice standards and could plausibly write international 
commitments in those terms as well.  
199 See Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When Is Command-and-Control Efficient? 
Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes 
for Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 887, 921–22 (characterizing “continuous 
emissions monitoring” as “necessary” for accurate tax assessment).  
200 See David M. Driesen & Amy Sinden, The Missing Instrument: Dirty Input Limits, 
33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 65, 67 (2009) (describing and evaluating DILs).  
201 See, e.g., id. at 80 (describing the problems in addressing transportation emissions 
of greenhouse gases through emissions trading). 
202 See id. at 104–09 (discussing the design and value of a fossil fuel DIL). 
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This part deliberately leaves out many insights in the instrument choice 
literature, including insights in my own articles on the subject. It simply shows that 
a more precise account of the means of environmental protection provides some 
insights into both limits of highly touted approaches and new possibilities meriting 
more attention. A good understanding of the principle means of meeting specific 
pollution control goals yields insights, just as an understanding of goals does. Putting 
means and ends together reveals still more.  
 
III.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEANS AND ENDS 
 
Understanding specific normative goals and regulatory means enables us to 
better understand the relationship between means and ends. Analysts sometimes 
confuse environmental law’s means with its ends in the discussion of technology-
based regulation, sometimes called “command-and-control” regulation. As we shall 
see, avoiding this conflation provides a clearer understanding of environmental law 
as a whole and insights into a host of important issues. 
This part begins by creating a framework for understanding the range of means-
ends relationships, which it derives primarily from a close analysis of the concept of 
technology-based regulation. It then shows how this framework illuminates 
establishment of goals for economic incentive programs (trading and then taxes) and 
the problem of addressing risk/risk issues—where addressing one environmental 
risk creates another.  
 
A.  Separating Means and Ends to Understand Technology-Based Regulation and 
the Wide Variety of Potential Means-Ends Combinations 
 
Some scholarship characterizes technology-based standards and “command 
and control” regulations as standards that mandate the use of a particular 
technology. 203  Some scholarship, however, characterizes technology-based 
regulation as specifying pollutant levels or technologies.204 Although this variation 
suggests some confusion, both of these descriptions treat technology-based 
regulation as a means of environmental protection, not as a goal-setting mechanism.  																																																								
203  KYSAR, supra note 9, at 5 (summarizing the case “against conventional 
environmental health and safety regulation” as equating “command-and-control regulation” 
with “mandating a single compliance technique . . . .”) (internal quotation omitted); see 
Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA’s 
Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 109–10 (1989) (stating that “command 
and control regulations . . . specify methods and technologies [that] firms must use to control 
pollution. . . .”); Sadowitz, supra note 17, at 18 (characterizing “[t]echnology-based 
standards” as “mandat[ing] the use of a particular technology. . . .”). 
204 See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental 
Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 5 (1991) (defining command 
and control regulation to include commands to use particular pollution controls and 
performance standards). 
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Careful parsing of the language in key standard setting provisions supports the 
conceptualization offered in part one, which treats technology-based regulation as 
embracing a goal of realizing technologically feasible emission reductions. This 
parsing also helps clarify the relationship between this goal and various means of 
environmental protection. 
Let us begin the parsing with the classic technology-based program¾the CWA 
BAT program. The most pertinent BAT provision requires EPA to “identify . . . the 
degree of effluent reduction attainable through the application of the best control 
measures and practices.”205 This provision does not leave EPA free to choose the 
general policy goal guiding decisions about the “degree” of water pollution 
reduction EPA may demand. It requires the amount of reduction in water pollution 
“attainable through the application of the best control measures and practices.”206 In 
other words, it demands that EPA, in setting effluent limitations assess the 
capabilities of technology. This means that EPA must establish effluent limitations 
that meet the goal of getting polluters to achieve the pollution reductions that the 
best technologies can achieve, neither more nor less. This technology-based criterion 
thereby establishes a goal for EPA standard setting. 
The BAT example also shows that the identification of technology-based 
standard setting with technological specification, i.e. with work practice standards, 
is usually incorrect. The CWA’s BAT provisions require EPA to write “effluent 
limitations.”207 The term effluent limitation implies a limit on the amount of effluent 
discharged¾a kind of performance standard. The phrase “degree of effluent 
reduction” refers to the amount of reduction in water pollution that will be 
demanded.208 And a review of the Code of Federal Regulations shows that effluent 
limitation guidelines, the actual requirements that polluters must meet, usually take 
the form of a performance standard¾generally limiting the parts per million of a 
pollutant allowed in water or the pounds of pollutant permitted per unit of 
production.209  
Some BAT limits, however, do take the form of a requirement to employ a 
particular technology.210 But the fact that some BAT limits take the form of work 
practice standards only cements the point that BAT limits sometimes specify 
technologies, but usually do not. All BAT limits, however, reflect EPA’s assessment 
of what the best technology can achieve and therefore serve the goal of maximizing 
feasible emission reductions. 																																																								
205 33 U.S.C.A §1314(b)(2)(A) (West 2016). 
206 Id. (emphasis added). 
207 See 33 U.S.C.A § 1311(b)(2)(A) (West 2016). 
208 Cf. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 286 (1978) (distinguishing 
the establishment of level of reduction from the technologies used to attain this level). 
209 See 40 C.F.R. Ch. I. Subch. N. pt. 400–71 (West 2016). 
210 See, e.g., Ass’n of Pac. Fisheries v. E.P.A., 615 F.2d 794, 802 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting 
that EPA requires the use of a dissolved air flotation unit to limit water pollution from fish 
processing operations). 
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The same basic structure governs every technology-based statutory provision 
that I am aware of, even though the details of these provisions vary in a number of 
respects.211 Thus, for example, the provision governing EPA’s recently promulgated 
rules regulating power plants’ carbon dioxide emissions¾section 111 of the 
CAA¾requires “emission limitation[s]” attainable with application of the “best” 
demonstrated “system of emission reduction.”212 Like the BAT provisions, section 
111 makes the capabilities of the best systems of emission reduction the measuring 
rod for the degree of stringency required.  
Furthermore, an emission limitation, like an effluent limitation, constitutes a 
performance standard. A different subsection of section 111, however, authorizes 
work practice standards when setting an emission limitation is impracticable.213 
Hence, even though these standards are technology-based in the sense that they 
reflect an assessment of what level of reductions the best demonstrated emission 
reduction system can achieve, they usually take the form of a performance standard, 
not a work practice standard.214 
Richard Stewart, however, has suggested that in practice technology-based 
performance standards provide “strong incentives to adopt the . . . technology 
underlying the [performance] standard” in spite of the formal structure that I have 
identified. 215  The empirical literature shows that in some cases polluters have 
adopted new technologies not anticipated by the agency in response to technology-
based standards.216 At the same time, if EPA has in fact based a standard on the best 																																																								
211 See, e.g., Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding 
that EPA may not limit use of ethanol in reformulated gasoline, because the CAA mandates 
performance standards); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Harrison, 660 F.2d 628, 636 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(holding that the authority to set a performance standard does not include the authority to 
specify fuels); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(m)(1) (West 2016) (distinguishing between specifying 
“levels” and treatment methods, but not expressing a policy preference for performance 
standards).  
212 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(a)(1) (West 2016); cf. 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1) (West 2016) 
(defining new source standards under the CWA in very similar terms). 
213 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411(b)(5), (h) (West 2016). 
214 See Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 285–86 (distinguishing 
between a quantitative “level” of emissions and the technological means employed to meet 
the level); Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 1429, 1444 (proposed Jan. 8, 2014) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71) (stating that EPA does not generally specify a 
technology that must be used to comply with new source performance standards under CAA 
section 111).  
215  See Richard Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A 
Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1256, 1268–69 (1981).  
216 See Nicholas Ashford et al., Using Regulations to Change the Market for Innovation, 
9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 419, 436–443 (1985) (discussing innovative responses to 
technology-based and other types of regulation); U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT 
OTA-ENV-635, GAUGING CONTROL TECHNOLOGY AND REGULATORY IMPACTS OF 
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and most cost effective technology, one would expect industry to use that technology 
unless it can cheaply eliminate the pollutant involved or develop an adequate 
alternative not known to EPA. But the basic point remains, as a formal matter 
technology-based standards do not always, or even usually, directly require a 
particular technology. Instead, a technology-based standard reflects a goal of 
maximizing reductions realizable through use of feasible technologies and often 
produces performance standards while sometimes producing work practice 
standards.  
Technology-based standards uniquely rely on technological capability to 
identify degrees of pollution control—i.e., as a measuring rod for goal setting. Their 
expression in the form of performance or work practice standards, however, does 
not constitute a unique characteristic of technology-based regulation. Other goal 
setting provisions also lead to establishment of performance or work practice 
standards. For example, effects-based provisions that are not technology-based, but 
instead focused on protecting public health, also generate work practice and 
performance standards.  
Section 112 of the pre-1990 CAA illustrates how effects-based goals generate 
performance standards—or, occasionally, work practice standards—as means 
toward ends that have little to do with technology. Before 1990, section 112 of that 
Act authorized health-based standards for hazardous air pollutants¾not technology-
based standards.217 Section 112, however, contained (and still contains) a provision 
that exactly parallels the provision in section 111 authorizing work practice 
standards while creating a presumption in favor of performance standards.218 In 
other words, when Congress adopted a health protection goal, rather than a 
feasibility goal, it still recognized that EPA might mandate employment of specific 
pollution control technologies and created the same policy about when to do so as 
that found in many technology-based statutory provisions—a preference for 
performance standards combined with authorization to dictate technologies when 
enforcement of a performance standard proves impractical. Section 112 therefore 
suggests that the policy issue of selecting the means of environmental protection 
remains basically the same regardless of what principle establishes the goal for a 
particular standard.  
This analysis suggests that a wide variety of goal setting procedures can lead 
to specification of a performance or work practice standard. The literature, however, 
sometimes wrongly suggests that specification of a performance standard or 
technology constitutes a unique attribute of technology-based rulemaking.  																																																								
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH¾AN APPRAISAL OF OSHA’S ANALYTICAL 
APPROACH 64 (1995) (discussing innovation in response to OSHA standards). 
217 See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. E.P.A., 824 F.2d 1146, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(noting that EPA must establish emission standards for hazardous air pollutants that protect 
public health with an “ample margin of safety”). 
218  See Adamo Wrecking, 434 U.S. at 286 (discussing the provision of the 1977 
Amendments authorizing work practice standards when “it is not feasible” to establish or 
enforce an “emission[s] standard”). 
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Separating means and ends rather than conflating them yields the insight that a 
wide combination of means and ends can exist, even when confining the analysis to 
means of achieving precisely specified regulatory goals. The chart below illustrates 
the full range of potential combinations suggested by the analysis provided in parts 
one and two: 
 
ENDS 
MEANS 
Effects-based Technology- 
Based 
Cost-Benefit 
Based 
Work Practice X X X 
Performance X X X 
Emissions Trading X X X 
Taxes X X X 
 
B.  Understanding the Problem of Goal Setting for Emissions Trading Programs 
and the Future of Climate Disruption Policy 
 
Like performance and work practice standards, an emissions trading program 
can provide a means of environmental protection serving a variety of goals.219 This 
point proves significant because it runs counter to the impression that the instrument 
choice literature creates and it yields very important insights and questions about the 
design of emissions trading programs. Since policies throughout the world have 
placed emissions trading at the heart of their efforts to address global climate 
disruption, insights into trading design matter a great deal.  
In order to establish an emissions trading program, one must set a goal for the 
program. This goal determines how many allowances the regulator distributes to 
polluters.220 The conventional way of thinking about establishing a goal for pollution 
trading involves reliance on CBA to determine an optimal level of pollution. I know 
of no case in which a government has based a trading program on an estimation of 
optimal pollution levels. 221  But we do have examples of effects-based and 
technology-based trading goals.222 Generally, tradable fishing quota programs aim 
to establish a limit for the overall catch that prevents depletion of the fishery¾an 
effects-based standard. 223  Trading programs aimed at limiting pollution have 
																																																								
219 See David M. Driesen, Capping Carbon, 40 ENVTL. L. 1, 20–27 (2010) (describing 
various cap setting goals). 
220 See id. at 13–15 (describing cap setting and allocation of allowances). 
221 Cf. id. at 31–32 (explaining that CBA has sometimes been used to influence cap 
setting decisions but not to produce optimal pollution levels). 
222 See id. at 28–31 (collecting examples of both effects-based and technology-based 
cap setting). 
223 See id. at 31 (discussing allowable catch limits for tradable fishing quota programs). 
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generally been technology-based.224 Examples include the acid rain program and the 
first phases of the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme.225 
Trading proponents, however, sometimes write about trading as an antidote to 
the problems they associate with technology-based rulemaking.226 They claim that 
emissions trading frees agencies from the technically arduous task of evaluating 
technologies, leaving that task to experts within individual companies complying 
with a trading program’s limits.227  
An analysis of the relationship between means and ends casts doubt upon this 
vision. For part one’s comparison between cost-benefit-based and technology-based 
goal setting reveals that they both depend on technological assessment, since cost 
estimates generally require technological assessment.228 In other words, to the extent 
that regulators wish to consider cost in establishing emissions trading programs, they 
generally must evaluate technologies.  
The goal setting analysis offered in part one suggests a way around this 
problem. One could set goals for trading programs based on protection of public 
health and the environment, regardless of cost. But the analysis in part one suggests 
that using effects-based goal setting to establish the number of allowances 
distributed would make goal setting more complicated in most cases than it would 
be if we employed a technology-based approach to goal setting.  
The writers most responsible for this view of trading as a cure for the supposed 
disease of technology-based rulemaking (Richard Stewart and Bruce Ackerman), 
however, envisioned legislative goal setting for trading.229 No formal criterion limits 
the factors politicians can consider when they establish a trading program. Although 
a wholly fact-free and utterly irrational political process establishing goals for a 																																																								
224 See id. at 28–30 (describing various technology-based emissions trading programs). 
225 See id. at 28–29, 32–33 (describing the use of BAT to guide the acid rain program 
and the first two phases of the EU emissions trading scheme). 
226 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 25, at 1335–37 (setting out an “indictment” of 
BAT). 
227 See id. at.1342–43 (claiming that trading transfers the technological assessment task 
from “bureaucrats” to “business managers and engineers”). 
228 Economists have sometimes based assessment of greenhouse gas abatement costs 
for the economy as a whole on past relationships between fuel prices and carbon dioxide 
emissions, rather than on technologies. See McGarity, supra note 108, at 218 (discussing 
top-down macroeconomic models that assume that consumers respond efficiently to energy 
price increases). These top-down estimation procedures, however, produce relatively high 
estimates of abatement costs and do not reflect cost reductions available because of 
technological advancement in the period since costly fuel prices produced a data set. See id. 
Accordingly, most carbon cost studies these days include some bottom-up analysis—
analysis based on evaluation of technologies capable of abating carbon dioxide. Not only is 
a top down methodology likely inappropriate for policy analysis aimed at informing specific 
regulatory decisions, it is simply unavailable for many sectors emitting greenhouse gases and 
generally not useful for other kinds of environmental problems.  
229 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 25, at 1354 (proposing that Congress specify 
the levels of pollution reduction to be achieved).  
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trading program could sidestep all the technical difficulties that afflict regulators 
setting goals for pollution reduction programs, any rational process would have to 
consider some information. And the teachings derived from the analysis of goal 
setting would apply to the norms and factual considerations rational politicians 
consider as they establish goals. Political decision making’s opacity has obscured 
this point¾that politicians rationally establishing emission limits for trading 
programs necessarily confront the same technical difficulties that administrators 
confront in establishing emissions limits for polluters. But the legislatively enacted 
acid rain program, for example, had a technology-based rationale for the overarching 
goal Congress chose. EPA had previously promulgated a new source performance 
standard for sulfur dioxide through technology-based rulemaking under section 111 
of the CAA.230 This number became the basis, if not the sole determinant, of the goal 
that Congress chose for the acid rain program.231 Had the analysis not already been 
done, legislators might well have to ask experts for fresh evaluations of 
technological options and costs.  
None of this denies that a legislative process involves compromise and might 
include political considerations other than the normative considerations identified 
here. For example, even though the acid rain program’s core goal comes rather 
directly from a technology-based rulemaking, legislators adjusted the allocation of 
allowances in various ways to accommodate specific particular electric utilities.232 
But unless the process is wholly irrational, something like the normative structure 
and the analytical questions it raises will play some role in the process.  
Furthermore, administrative agencies often establish trading programs. 233 
When they do, they do so under law that embodies the goals canvassed in part one. 
The recognition that emissions trading must inevitably be paired with goal 
setting and a clear-eyed view of the difficulties extant goal setting mechanisms 
create for regulators should lead to further research on emissions trading’s political 
economy. Such research will likely prove vital to addressing the greatest 																																																								
230 See Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources, 36 Fed. Reg. 24,875, 
24,879 (Dec. 23, 1971) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 60.43(b)). 
231  See A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., ALLOCATION IN THE EUROPEAN EMISSIONS 
TRADING SCHEME: RIGHTS, RENTS, AND FAIRNESS 339, 353 (A. Denny Ellerman et al. eds., 
2007) (describing the 1.2 lbs./mBTU limit as based on “the best available control 
technology”); Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade: 
Moving Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 400–01 (2009) (noting that the 
“basic formula” underlying the goal for phase two allowances represented the multiplication 
of this emissions rate by the baseline emissions for electric utilities). 
232 Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmallensee, The Political Economy of Market-Based 
Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, 41 J.L. & ECON. 37, 55–56 (1998) 
(discussing individual variations from the basic rule for setting allowances and the 
motivations for them). 
233 See, e.g., North Carolina v. E.P.A., 531 F.3d 896, 903 (D.C. Cir.), on reh’g in part, 
550 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (discussing EPA’s creation of a trading program to address 
interstate air pollution). 
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environmental challenge we face, global climate disruption, because of 
governments’ heavy reliance on emissions trading to address this problem.  
Emissions trading programs, including trading programs addressing climate 
disruption, have often suffered from insufficiently ambitious underlying emission 
limitations.234 Some of this laxness arises from regulators succumbing to polluters’ 
insistence that the limits not demand anything more than reasonably available 
technologies can achieve.235 Economists reviewing the European Union’s emissions 
trading scheme have found this consideration of technological capabilities surprising 
and suggest that this reflects a failure to fully embrace the philosophy of emissions 
trading.236 But the literature on emissions trading has very little to say about how the 
flexibility trading offers should influence goal setting, instead treating ambitious 
goal setting as likely under trading simply because trading lowers cost.237  
The question of what sort of shift in goal setting and the philosophy underlying 
it would make sense and appropriately take advantage of trading’s capacity to lower 
costs requires much greater attention. Can we project trading’s cost savings 
sufficiently well a priori to take the savings into account when we consider what 
goals are appropriate? Should trading justify a philosophical approach similar to that 
underlying technology-forcing? That is, in light of trading’s capacity to make 
compliance much cheaper than anticipated, should we simply have faith and put less 
emphasis on formal cost estimation? Should we get cost considerations wholly off 
the table in some cases based on alignment of trading with political commitments 
made in international negotiations or simply a philosophy of protecting public 
health? The failure to understand that trading is only a means toward some larger 
end and does not automatically avoid the philosophical and technical problems we 
confront in establishing goals for environmental law has distracted us from even 
seeing, much less addressing, these vital questions.  
 
C.  Goal Setting and Pollution Taxes 
 
Most economists envision pollution taxes based on the concept of optimal 
pollution.238 A regulator setting an optimal pollution tax would estimate the dollar 																																																								
234  See Cento Veljanovski, Economic Approaches to Regulation, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK, supra note 183, at 17, 31 (characterizing the over allocation of allowances in 
the EU’s emissions trading scheme in phase one as producing “no expected reduction” of 
emissions). 
235 See Tschochohei & Zöckler, supra note 24, at 31 (describing the cap setting under 
the EU’s emissions trading scheme as driven by special interests and using a “command-
and-control approach”). 
236 See id. at 32 (suggesting that emissions trading should have changed the “pattern of 
thought” in some unspecified way from that of “command-and-control”). 
237  Cf. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 25, at 1351–59 (coupling trading with a 
proposal for legislative establishment of quantitative pollution reduction mandates). 
238 See William J. Baumol & Wallace E. Oates, The Use of Standards and Prices for 
the Protection of the Environment, 73 SWED. J. ECON. 42, 43–44 (1971) (describing the 
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value of the harms the taxed pollution generates and establish a tax rate at that 
level.239 By doing so the regulator encourages polluters to equalize costs and benefits 
at the margin, producing an optimal level of pollution. 
The economists Baumol and Oates, however, have assumed in some of their 
work that policy makers enacting a pollution tax might calibrate it to achieve a 
quantitative pollution target.240 Since a tax does not specify a target, but rather leads 
polluters to adopt whatever technological improvements might save them money at 
a given tax rate, they envision an iterative process in which economists estimated a 
tax’s effect on pollution and then policy makers adjust the tax rate iteratively until 
the polluters make the desired reductions.241  
The analysis above, however, shows that a rational politically chosen goal to 
guide selection of a tax rate will have something in common with the feasibility 
principle, protecting public health and the environment, or cost-benefit balancing 
and all of the analytical difficulties those considerations imply. This implies that 
choosing a tax rate implicates the philosophical and analytical questions that arise 
in establishing standards regulating pollution.  
This similarity may seem odd to those accustomed to thinking of a tax within 
an optimality framework, but the first pollution tax proposed in the United States 
was technology-based. 242  That is, legislators proposed a tax rate based on the 
estimated cost of available control technology. Such a tax rate would presumably 
encourage the adoption of the available technology. Indeed, rational regulators 
cannot avoid the issues described in this Article’s goal setting section if they plan to 
rely on a tax as a principle strategy to address an environmental problem. A tax rate 
set at a price exceeding the cost of available pollution control technologies might be 
needed to achieve a health-based goal and might have the consequence of either 
forcing technological innovation or closing facilities. Conversely, setting a tax rate 
below the cost of any available pollution control method would produce revenue but 
might not reduce pollution.243 Rational regulators, even if they are elected political 
officials, will likely consider the technical and normative questions that the goal 
setting analysis raises, at least implicitly, in establishing a tax rate.  																																																								
“proper level” of a “Pigouvian tax” as equal to the marginal damages caused by the targeted 
pollutant and describing economists as reluctant “to give up the Pigouvian solution”). 
239 Id. at 43. 
240 See id. at 44–45 (positing using taxes to obtain “somewhat arbitrary standards” for 
an acceptable environment).  
241 See id. at 45 (describing the iterative process). 
242 See Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 19, at 745 n.88. 
243 Faced with a pollution tax, polluters will pass the price increase on to consumers if 
they can. But if doing so will likely cause too great a consumption decline, they may simply 
absorb the tax. Conversely, if producers pass the tax on to consumers with the expectation 
that consumers will not greatly reduce consumption in response, then the tax may decrease 
consumers’ wealth without significant reduction in consumption of the product producing 
the targeted pollution. Only if the price increase is passed on to consumers and produces a 
decline in consumption of the taxed producers’ products will production and hence pollution 
decline in the taxed industry. 
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To be sure, a regulator wholly dedicated to allocative efficiency could set the 
tax rate equal to the social cost of pollution. This would represent a normative shift 
in positive law, which has almost never embraced allocative efficiency as a goal. It 
would also change the form of analysis found in the positive law, but not in a way 
that simplifies analysis. To establish the social cost of pollution, the regulator would 
have to engage in quantitative risk assessment and monetization, the most difficult 
steps involved in CBA. The regulator could, however, avoid analyzing technology 
and its cost. In short, only taxation provides a means of shifting the analytical 
predicate for standard goal setting, but, alas, it does so in a way that does not shed 
the key analytical complexities that have beset CBA. 
 
D.  Privatizing Technological Choice, Setting Goals, and Risk/Risk Problems 
 
This discussion of technological evaluation’s centrality when regulators 
consider cost in establishing a program’s goals brings us to a related question about 
the framework developed in this Article. Does this framework aid us in confronting 
risk/risk dilemmas that several prominent commentators have emphasized?244 The 
risk/risk dilemma usually arises because technological changes adopted to address 
one environmental problem can create another. Thus, for example, United States 
electric utilities have helped lower carbon emissions from power plants in recent 
years by switching from coal to natural gas, which has become very cheap because 
of the development of hydraulic fracturing (fracking)—obtaining natural gas 
through horizontal drilling aided by the use of fluids to fracture underground rock 
formations.245 Yet, fracking poses risks to water quality, usually increases emissions 
of a very potent greenhouse gas¾methane, and can cause earthquakes. 246 																																																								
244  See generally John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk 
Tradeoffs, in RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 1, 1–2 (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995) (explaining 
that “efforts to combat a ‘target risk’” can increase other risks); W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL 
TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR RISK vii (1992) (noting the 
inevitability of tradeoffs); Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1533, 1535 (1996). 
245 See Thomas W. Merrill, Four Questions About Fracking, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
971, 972–74 (2013) (explaining fracking and discussing the significance of the price declines 
it has caused). 
246 See Walter H. Boone & Mandie B. Robinson, “Whole Lotta Shakin’ Going on”: 
Recent Studies Link Fracking and Earthquakes, 82 DEF. COUNS. J. 68, 69 (2015) (discussing 
“[t]he documented and undisputed rise in the number of earthquakes in close proximity 
to . . . fracking operations”); William J. Brady & James P. Crannell, Hydraulic Fracturing 
Regulation in the United States: The Laissez-Faire Approach of the Federal Government 
and Varying State Regulations, 14 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 39, 42–3 (2012) (discussing risks to 
water and methane emissions); Jeffrey M. Gaba, Flowback: Federal Regulation of 
Wastewater from Hydraulic Fracturing, 39 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 251, 265–68 (2014) 
(describing the generation of waste water from fracking and the hazards associated with it). 
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Accordingly, EPA’s regulations reducing power plant carbon dioxide emissions, for 
example, might increase these ancillary risks if utilities respond by using more 
natural gas. The framework developed above helps provide an even-handed analysis 
of risk/risk issues and reveals dilemmas not widely appreciated in the risk/risk 
literature. 
One might think that risk/risk issues provide a reason to increase CBA’s use. 
If CBA comprehensively addresses all costs and benefits, it would address risk/risk 
issues.  
The framework provided, and for that matter, simply the idea of taking positive 
law seriously in evaluating regulatory reforms, suggests that one should at least ask 
whether other goal setting provisions and, for that matter, the selection of means of 
environmental protection, might account for, or cause neglect of, risk/risk 
considerations. 
It turns out that the environmental statutes require the consideration of ancillary 
risks in promulgating both effects-based and technology-based standards in various 
ways.247 It also turns out that CBA sometimes does not address ancillary risks. The 
existing and modified power plant rulemaking’s CBA, for example, did not consider 
ancillary risks from fracking as a cost.248 Taking the positive law into account would 
greatly change the debate on how to address risk/risk problems. One might ask, for 
example, whether an analytical approach that seeks to quantify and monetize 
everything offers the best method of evaluating risk/risk issues in light of 
uncertainties and questions about the appropriate scope of analysis.  
Furthermore, the positive law suggests something implicit in this presentation 
of risk/risk problems—that they often depend on the selection of technologies. 
Select natural gas as a technology for reducing carbon dioxide emissions, and one 
gets water quality, methane, and earthquake concerns. Select windmills, and one 
gets concerns about aesthetics and birds. Thus, evaluation of risk/risk problems 
requires an evaluation of the particular technologies polluters employ to meet 
environmental goals.  
Those urging adoption of CBA in order to address risk/risk problems, however, 
in the same breath often recommend turning technological selection over to private 
parties through emissions trading. 249  This privatization of technological choice 																																																								
247  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A § 7408(f)(2)(C); § 7409(d)(2(C)(iv); § 7411(a)(1); § 
7412(d)(2), (f)(2)(A) (West 2016). 
248  EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED CARBON POLLUTION 
GUIDELINES FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS AND EMISSION STANDARDS FOR MODIFIED AND 
RECONSTRUCTED POWER PLANTS, at ES-3–ES-48 (June 2014) (defining costs in terms of 
compliance costs alone). In fairness to the EPA, if it were to count the environmental costs 
from fracking in the CBA, symmetry would require it to count the benefits from reduced 
deaths, disease, and injuries in coal mines. And it did estimate the impact of its rule on 
methane emissions from natural gas and coal, although it did not monetize these results. Id. 
at 4-13–4-14, 8-3. 
249 See, e,g., Cass Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 10 
(1995) (recommending more use of “economic incentives” and CBA). 
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should pose issues for those who argue that environmental law pays insufficient 
attention to risk/risk dilemmas. After all, the selection of technologies to actually 
use, rather than the establishment of emission limits underlying a trading program, 
directly causes most risk/risk problems. The risk/risk issue from this perspective 
presents a dilemma. Allowing private control over technological choices maximizes 
cost effectiveness and engages firms’ expert knowledge. At the same time, private 
control over technological choice negates the public evaluation of the seriousness of 
risk/risk problems that CBA proponents advocate.250  
To sum up, understanding the array of means and ends found in environmental 
law and juxtaposing them significantly increases our understanding of 
environmental law and the issues it raises. It suggests that more combinations of 
means and ends exist than commonly thought. It undercuts stereotypical thinking 
about both the nature of “command-and-control” regulation and economic 
incentives, showing that the former is more variegated, complex, and sometimes 
necessary than we thought, and that the latter, whatever their advantages as means 
of environmental protection do not automatically solve or even finesse questions 
about goals. Furthermore, private technological flexibility, while desirable in a 
number of respects, poses some risk/risk issues. These insights open up a variety of 
questions important to environmental law in general and to climate disruption law 
in particular.  
 
IV.  FURTHER STEPS TOWARD A POSITIVE THEORY 
 
The material above demonstrates that a clear account of the means and ends of 
environmental law yields important insights and research questions. Yet, a positive 
theory of environmental law must go beyond means and ends to reach some other 
matters. This part aims to encourage future work filling out the positive theory of 
environmental law by identifying two elements that such a theory should include—
namely accounts of environmental federalism and enforcement. It then preliminarily 
explores a question that those contributing to a positive theory of environmental law 
should address—whether such a theory has anything to say about environmental 
justice.  
 
A.  Environmental Federalism 
 
Most federalism scholarship focuses on constitutional law, which can be 
relevant to environmental law. So, for example, courts have addressed the 
constitutionality of environmental statutes under the Commerce Clause.251 A whole 																																																								
250 See David M. Driesen, Trading and Its Limits, 14 PA. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 169, 173 
(2006) (leaving the choice of technologies to regulated parties leaves the government with 
no timely means of evaluating risk/risk tradeoffs). 
251 See e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 268, 
281 (1981) (upholding a statute protecting the environment from coal mining’s adverse 
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line of cases under the dormant Commerce Clause (judicial limits on state authority 
derived from the Constitution’s affirmative grant of Commerce Clause authority to 
Congress) has addressed municipal regulation of solid waste.252 And the leading case 
on the anticommandeering principle now associated with the Tenth Amendment 
resolved a dispute regarding federal mechanisms to secure state cooperation in 
addressing radioactive waste disposal issues.253 An enormous amount of scholarship 
focuses on understanding the doctrines underlying these environmental cases.254  
More importantly for environmental law’s core commitments, environmental 
statutes embody a host of political decisions about when to exercise federal authority 
and when to leave policy or enforcement in state hands. Richard Revesz and Kirsten 
Engel have addressed a core rationale for the move made in the 1970s to give 
substantial authority over environmental policy to the federal government—the fear 
of a “race to the bottom” where states lowered environmental standards to attract 
business.255 This is a key rationale for an important feature of environmental law. 
And this scholarship addresses another important rationale for a substantial federal 
role—the need for federal help in solving contentious problems of interstate 
pollution not within the control of any one state.256  
But this scholarship says little about the particular arrangement of authorities 
found in environmental statutes, which often leaves substantial authority with state 
																																																								
effects); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 327–29 (1981) (upholding specific environmental 
restrictions on mining). 
252 See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 217, 
224–35 (1996) (discussing three Supreme Court environmental dormant Commerce Clause 
cases decided in the 1993 term).  
253  See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (invalidating two 
provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 because 
the Constitution does not permit the federal government to compel states to provide for 
disposal of waste generated with their borders).  
254 See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress 
Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1004–
007 (1995) (discussing the anti–commandeering principle established in the radioactive 
waste siting case); Heinzerling, supra note 252, at 224–31, 242–46 (discussing the dormant 
Commerce Clause cases based on solid waste); John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause 
Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174, 209 (1998) (discussing the 
application of Commerce Clause limitations to the ESA). 
255 See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and 
Is It “To the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 274–80 (1997) (supporting the race-to-the-
bottom rationale); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 
“Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1210, 1211 (1992) (disputing the race-to-the-bottom rationale for federal regulation of the 
environment). 
256  See, e.g., Engel, supra note 255, at 371–74 (generally endorsing rather than 
critiquing the existing system); Revesz, supra note 255, at 1222 (arguing that interstate 
externalities justify federal regulation).  
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governments.257 William Buzbee has addressed a key aspect of that arrangement of 
authority, a pattern of preempting state standards less strict than the federal standards 
while usually allowing states to regulate more strictly than the federal government 
does.258 
The environmental statues, however, often not only allow for stand-alone state 
law addressing pollution, they often envision a substantial state role in implementing 
federal environmental law.259 For example, the CAA requires EPA to establish the 
NAAQS but charges states with the fundamental responsibility to come up with most 
of the specific pollution limits needed to meet these ambient standards. 260 
Conversely, the CWA gives states the primary responsibility for formulating water 
quality standards but makes basic regulation of most major dischargers (point 
sources in the jargon of the Act) primarily an EPA responsibility.261 A positive 
theory of environmental federalism should note and seek to explain this discrepancy. 
Furthermore, several statutes do not contemplate a substantial state policy role.262 A 
positive theory might seek to explain what justifies coupling a substantial state role 
for the media specific statutes with nationalization of the regulation of toxics under 
FIFRA and TSCA. In any case, a positive theory should provide a description and 
normative explanation of key federalism policy decisions found in environmental 
law.  
 
B.  Enforcement 
 
Clifford Rechtschaffen has ably described the normative theory underlying 
environmental enforcement in Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory 																																																								
257 See Engel, supra note 255, at 369–74 (not describing the arrangement of authorities 
generally, but offering certain regional governance provisions in the Clean Air Act as a 
model); cf. Revesz, supra note 255, at 1224–27 (describing some of the division of authority 
between the federal and state governments under the Clean Air Act, but not providing a trans-
statutory description of the arrangement of authority). 
258  See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the 
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1555 (2007) (arguing that principled 
rationales support a “one-way ratchet” that preempts less stringent state regulation while 
preserving state authority to go beyond federal minimums). 
259 See id. at 1550 (pointing out that under cooperative federalism statutes state and 
local governments assume critically important regulatory duties). 
260 See Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60, 65–67 (1975). 
261 See Ass’n of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 801 (1980) (explaining that 
Congress charged EPA with the duty to establish BAT and best practicable control 
technology standards); Adler, supra note 47, at 213 (explaining that states usually 
promulgate water quality standards).  
262 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 2617(a) (West 2016); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 
431, 437–38, (2005) (explaining that EPA, rather than the states, administers the pesticide 
registration requirements and determines the appropriate labeling for pesticides); cf. 
Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 600 (1991) (holding that FIFRA does 
not preempt local governments’ pesticide regulation). 
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of Environmental Enforcement.263 He points out that the law governing enforcement 
of environmental standards has traditionally relied heavily on a theory of adequate 
deterrence.264 In recent decades, however, a model of cooperative enforcement has 
emerged, which places more emphasis on voluntarily eliciting compliance rather 
than deterring law breaking through enforcement actions.265 He also shows how in 
practice agency officials usually combine elements of both philosophies. 266  He 
shows how the deterrence model underlies key features of the enforcement regime, 
such as substantial civil penalties, criminal penalties for deliberate noncompliance, 
and the availability of citizen suits when government fails to enforce the law 
adequately.267 A positive theory of environmental enforcement along these lines 
constitutes an important element of a positive theory of environmental law.  
 
C.  Environmental Justice 
 
In recent years, a movement for environmental justice has grown up, which has 
influenced environmental law and our thinking about it. Environmental justice 
scholars highlight issues of distribution. 268  In particular, they allege that 
communities of color suffer from disproportionate pollution burdens.269 They also 
advocate close consultation with minority communities about siting industrial 
facilities and other environmental decisions affecting those communities.270  
A theory of positive law raises questions about how to think about 
environmental justice’s relationship to environmental law. Perhaps most 
fundamentally, should we think of it as a critique of the existing positive law from 
the outside but obtaining some influence, more or less like law and economics? Or 
does it highlight something about the positive theory of environmental law?  																																																								
263 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1191–93 (1998). 
264 See id. at 1186 (pointing out that environmental law has traditionally been based on 
a deterrence theory).  
265 See id. at 1203 (describing the push toward a more cooperative model).  
266  See id. at 1189 (stating that in practice enforcers combine deterrence and 
cooperation).  
267 See id. at 1186–89, 1230–33 (linking substantial penalties and citizen suits to the 
deterrence model).  
268 See Anne K. No, Environmental Justice: Concentration on Education and Public 
Participation as an Alternative Solution to Legislation, 20 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 373, 378 (1996) (equating environmental justice with the equitable sharing of pollution 
burdens). 
269 See CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & EILEEN GUANA, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW, 
POLICY, AND REGULATION 55–76 (2002) (reviewing disparate impact claims).  
270 See No, supra note 268, at 391 (identifying expansion of public participation in 
minority communities as a major advantage of President Clinton’s environmental justice 
policy); Scott Kuhn, Expanding Public Participation Is Essential to Environmental Justice 
and the Democratic Decisionmaking Process, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 647, 648 (1999) 
(identifying meaningful public participation as a “central tenet” of the environmental justice 
movement). 
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It bears mention that the positive law has always reflected some concerns akin 
to those that environmental justice advocates highlight. The CAA, for example, has 
always demanded that the NAAQS adequately protect vulnerable subpopulations.271 
Environmental justice may do both; it may provide a normative challenge to some 
aspects of environmental law while helping to rationalize several features of existing 
law. But more work on these issues might help advance our understanding of both 
environmental justice and the positive theory of environmental law.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Thus, an understanding of environmental law’s means and ends makes it 
possible to understand the field as a whole, both in terms of the overall structure of 
statutes and relationships between means and ends. This analysis of means and ends 
yields a host of valuable insights and significant research questions. It also provides 
an important foundation for evaluating proposed regulatory reforms. A reasonably 
complete theory, at a minimum, should also explain key features of the enforcement 
regime and the allocation of authority among governments. The theory of means and 
ends articulated here constitutes a very substantial step forward in constructing a 
positive theory of environmental law as a whole.  
																																																								
271 See, e.g. Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512, 526 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(remanding a NAAQS for particulate to EPA because EPA has not explained how its rule 
will adequately protect children and other vulnerable subpopulations). 
